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At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a relatively open and export-oriented economy 
with a policy environment that was favorable to the agricultural sector. Unlike many other 
developing countries, the ruling elite in Kenya had strong links to agriculture and 
implemented policies that supported both smallholder and large-scale producers. For most of 
the next 20 years the agricultural sector thrived, the economy in general grew, and the 
country enjoyed political stability. In contrast, the second 20 years of independence were 
marked by agricultural and economic stagnation and persistent struggles with corruption and 
other forms of poor governance. In recent years there have been signs of recovery and growth 
in both agriculure and the economy generally. 
This chapter first reviews major developments in the structure of the Kenyan 
economy and summarizes economic policies up to independence. It then presents measures of 
policy-induced price distortions over the 1963-2004 period. Distortions are measured through 
estimated rates of assistance based on comparisons of domestic commodity prices with 
undistorted world market prices. Finally, the paper links changes in rates of protection and 
disprotection to the evolution of various policies over the same period.  
From 1965 to 1981, Kenya’s real GDP per capita rose at an average rate of 2.5 
percent a year while agricultural value added grew at an annual rate of almost 5 percent.
1 
During this period, the state presence in the economy expanded: the prices for most 
agricultural commodities were administered by marketing boards, and trade was restricted 
through import licensing regulations. Nonetheless, for the first 20 years of independence the 
agricultural sector was spared high direct or indirect taxation as measured in the nominal 
rates of assistance, except during a few periods of exchange rate distortion.  
After this promising start, growth in agricultural production and in per capita income 
faltered in the early 1980s and stagnated until after 2004, when performance improved 
markedly. Slow growth in income was paralleled with rising rates of poverty. In 1982, the 
rural headcount poverty rate in the country was 48 percent, ranging from 26 percent in the 
agriculturally rich Central Province to 58 percent in Nyanza Province. Ten years later, the 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise noted, data in this paper are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online.  
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average rural poverty rate was unchanged, but the rate in Central Province had risen to 36 
percent. In 1997 the rural poverty rate was 53 percent (Republic of Kenya 2000). Aggregate 
rural and urban poverty rates were estimated to be 55 percent in 2001 and 56 percent in 2003 
(International Monetary Fund 2005). 
Policy initiatives starting in the late 1980s often centered on liberalizing the 
agricultural economy in an effort to reduce transaction costs and ensure that producer prices 
reflected global scarcity values. However, the process of liberalization suffered various 
policy reversals (World Bank 1998, WTO 2000) and was complicated by increasing macro-
economic instability in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, domestic market liberalization has made 
considerable progress in recent years. While many marketing boards still exist, their roles are 
greatly diminished. Meanwhile, trade policy reforms have replaced licensing schemes with 
tariffs, and the tariffs have been steadily reduced. Finally, a shift to a floating exchange rate 
system in 1993 has eliminated currency overvaluation as a source of price distortion. 
Despite the recent policy reforms, performance in the agricultural sector has been 
disappointing, except for the dramatic expansion in the production of horticultural products 
and the recovery of cereals production in 2004-06. Slow growth in the marketed supply of 
cereal crops is partly due to rural population growth and increased consumption on farms. 
External shocks, including the coffee crisis, have also been partly to blame for poor 
performance. Probably more important for this analysis is the problem of excessively high 
domestic marketing margins. As a result of the poor state of the rural infrastructure, 
producers face costs of delivering output and securing inputs that are sometimes prohibitively 
high (Omamo 1998, Obare, Omamo and Williams 2003). For certain commodities, 
regulations continue to protect high-cost public enterprises and parastatals, further raising 
transaction costs. Moreover, continued regulation and red tape raises the costs of doing 
business while introducing avenues for corruption (World Bank 2006). All these costs tax the 
agricultural sector in ways that are not fully reflected in the price distortions calculated here.  
Two important developments in the agricultural sector have influenced trends in the 
measured rates of assistance apart from any changes in policy. First, due to growth in 
population and demand, wheat and maize have shifted from being exportable commodities to 
being importable. Since administered prices were set within the fob-cif band in the major 
production areas, this shift implied a change from subsidizing to taxing production, compared 
to the world market alternative. Second, the role of coffee in the sector has fallen compared to 
both tea and horticultural production. Because the market for fruits and vegetables is largely  
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undistorted, this has muted the weighted average rate of distortion in the agricultural 
economy.  
Kenya has rarely experienced egregious price distortions in the agricultural sector, but 
the degree of government support for agricultural development has been uneven over time. 
Currently growth in the sector seems to be more inhibited by limited public investment and 
excessive red tape than by distorting policy interventions. The success in exports of fruits, 
vegetables and cut flowers was facilitated by targeted public investment in extension, rural 
roads and improvements in the Nairobi airport (Schapiro and Wainaina 1991, Minot and 
Ngigi 2004). The revitalization of much of the agricultural sector may require investments in 
physical infrastructure to reduce transactions costs as well as administrative reforms to allow 
more creative marketing arrangements and macro-economic stability to encourage private 
investment. Public investments should be targeted to commodities that have some potential 
comparative advantage. This analysis suggests which commodities those may be. 
Unfortunately the current analysis cannot reveal the precise degree to which current 
marketing margins are inflated by regulations. 
 
 
Growth and structural changes since 1955 
 
 
Kenya’s strong economic performance up to 1980 was rooted in growth of the agricultural 
sector, which has consistantly accounted for a large share of employment, value added, and 
exports. The expansion of agricultural output between 1955 and 1980 was based on increases 
in cropped area and the opening of commercial production opportunities to smallholder, 
African producers. From 1960 to 1969, cereals output rose by 69 percent, with cropped area 
growing by 61 percent (FAOSTAT). Investment in agricultural research also produced 
improvements in yields for maize (the primary staple) and the export crops coffee and tea. 
Price booms for those exports in the 1970s further boosted performance.  
The Kenyan economy has yet to experience a structural transformation into industrial 
production (Appendix Figure 1). Indeed the manufacturing sector has seen no growth in its 
share of the economy, and agriculture continues to account for almost 30 percent of national 
income. The significance of agriculture in the economy is larger than official data suggest 
since agriculture has a disproportionately large share of employment, accounting for over 50 
percent of export revenues, and directly contributing to about 50 percent of manufacturing  
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production. In the last 10 years, growth in services, including exportable services (tourism) 
has eroded somewhat the centrality of agriculture. Value added data suggest that the 
declining share of the agricultural sector in GDP is due to more rapid expansion in services, 
not to an agricultural output decline. Data on marketed agricultural production from the 
Government of Kenya’s Statistical Abstract of Kenya give a somewhat different impression, 
indicating agricultural stagnation since 1990 (Figure 1).  
Not surprisingly, trends in GDP per capita have mirrored growth in the agricultural 
sector. Figure 1 juxtaposes data on per capita GDP with agricultural value added and with the 
value of marketed agricultural production. Both series show a close correspondence between 
strong agricultural performance and strong per capita income growth up to 1982. From that 
point on, the agricultural value added figures continue to grow while per capita incomes and 
marketed production stagnate. This pattern probably reflects the strain that population growth 
has placed on the agricultural sector. Kenya’s total population grew at an average rate of over 
3 percent annually from 1980 through 2004, with the rural population rising from 13.6 
million to 20 million during that period. With this population growth, agricultural land per 
agricultural worker halved, falling from about 4.4 hectares in 1980 to 2.2 hectares in 2004. 
Meanwhile, agricultural workers faced a high dependency ratio as about 50 percent of the 
population was less than 15 years old throughout the period. While agricultural value added 
continued to grow through the 1990s, the increases in production did not match population 
growth and were in large part consumed on farm. 
While the Kenyan economy has seen little in the way of structural transformation, the 
structure of the agricultural sector itself has evolved considerably since 1955. In the first 
instance, smallholder production expanded over estate production for both the main export 
crops (coffee and tea) and for maize, the primary staple. Through the 1960s the share of 
marketed production from smallholders increased rapidly, as did total production. For 
example, tea production rose from 13,000 MT with 1 percent grown by smallholders in 1960 
to 20,000 MT with 5 percent grown by smallholders in 1965 and 40,000 MT with 20 percent 
grown by smallholders in 1970. The smallholder share of coffee production rose from 20 
percent in 1960 to 50 percent in 1965 while total production rose over 65 percent (Republic 
of Kenya, various years). Smallholders now produce half of Kenya’s coffee and about 60 
percent of its tea. 
Expansion of smallholder production did not initially affect the crop mix in 
production or in exports, but over time this has also evolved. Figure 2 shows there have been 
pronounced changes in the production mix. First, coffee has declined in significance. This is  
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due both to declining world market prices for the commodity and to low growth in output in 
the last 20 years. Meanwhile tea has expanded, with tea replacing coffee as the single largest 
export commodity by value in about 1990 and remaining in that position since then 
(Appendix Figure 2). Growth in both tea and sugar production was facilitated by institutional 
innovations and investments to support smallholder production and to formalize the 
marketing chains that serve smallholders.  
More dramatic than the expansion of tea production has been the growth in exports of 
horticultural products, as exemplified by green beans exports (Appendx Figure 2). Before 
1985 Kenya recorded no exports of green beans. By the year 2000, green beans exports 
exceeded coffee exports. Altogether, fruits and vegetables (F&V) have accounted for about 
20 percent of the value of Kenya’s agricultural exports since 2000, about one-quarter of 
which has been from green beans. Canned pineapples and other fresh vegetables represent 
most of the remaining exports in this class. Cut flowers exports have grown on a similar path 
as fruits and vegetables, and account for an even larger share of export revenue (Economic 
Survey of Kenya 2005). 
The data on production shares in Figure 2 are compiled from government sources, 
FAOSTAT and scholarly research. Because a large share of maize production is not marketed 
and much of the marketed maize is sold in informal markets, total maize production is 
estimated at about four times the marketed output (Pearson et al. 1995, Jayne et al. 2001). 
Inflating marketed production figures from the Statisitical Abstract of Kenya by this factor 
results in production estimates close to those reported in FAOSTAT and  Hassan and Karanja 
(1997). As for horticulture, government sources report only sales of specific crops and do not 
cover the same crops in all years. Export data are therefore used to estimate production of 
tradable fruits and vegetables. Moreover, Muendo, Tschirley, and Weber (2004) suggest that 
the domestic market for fruits and vegetables production may have much larger value than 
the export market. The domestic market for fruits and vegetables is dominated by tomatoes, 
cabbages and kales (sukuma wiki), with substantial production of cooking bananas and 
potatoes. Argwings-Kodhek (2005) places the value added from domestic horticulture to be 
similar in scale to export horticulture (including floriculture). Despite the limitations of the 
data, it is certain that maize has been and remains the core of agricultural production in 
Kenya and that tea and fruits and vegetables output have expanded rapidly while coffee has 
been in decline. 
In addition to changes in crop mix and export concentration, Kenya has experienced a 
change in market position. As Figure 2 shows, domestic consumption patterns have been  
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fairly stable with maize accounting for 40 to 50 percent of food expenditures and wheat 
drawing an additional 10 percent. The country, however, has shifted from being a net 
exporter of wheat and maize in the 1950s and 1960s to becoming a net importer of both of 
these cereals in since the 1990s. The transition from exporter to importer occurred fairly 
abruptly in the 1970s for wheat, but was more prolonged for maize. Kenya was a net exporter 
of maize for most of the 1960s and 1970s, while during the 1980s it oscillated between maize 
surplus and deficit. Since the 1990s, however, it has been a fairly consistent importer, despite 
the government’s policy of targeting maize self-sufficiency. This transition has also come 
despite successful research efforts to develop improved varieties of maize that have been 
widely adopted. Indeed, maize yields rose by 1.5 percent annually from 1975 to 1984 and 
continued to rise through the 1990s (Hasan and Karanja 1997). 
 
 
Agricultural policy in the colonial period, 1895 to 1963 
 
 
Agricultural policy during the colonial period in Kenya (1895-1963) was largely motivated 
by a need to make the East African railroad system profitable. Towards that end, European 
settlers were encouraged to enter the high potential agricultural areas of the colony (the so-
called “White Highlands”) and produce commercial crops to be shipped by rail to Mombasa. 
Coffee was the initial focus of export production, but colonial authorities promoted 
experimentation with a range of commodities including wheat, tea, cotton and pyrethrum. 
The colonial administration favored settler agriculture, and policies were biased strongly 
against indigenous, smallholder producers (Mosley 1983).  
Colonial agricultural policies included alienation of land from local populations to 
create an estate sector of European-owned farms. Labor markets were also restricted, with hut 
taxes used as an explicit device for channeling African labor to the estate sector. Access to 
export markets was restricted to European producers, further encouraging labor supply to the 
estate sector while protecting European producers from domestic competition. Finally, 
starting in the mid-1930s, agricultural finance was made available to estate producers at 
subsidized rates (Winter-Nelson 1995). According to Smith (1976), the bulk of tax revenue 
prior to the Second World War was collected from native populations, while public 
investment in infrastructure and agricultural research concentrated on the estate sector.  
 
7
Agricultural commodity markets came under administered pricing systems during the 
colonial period (Mosley 1983, Winter-Nelson 1995). Export-crop marketing boards were 
established in the 1930s to reduce costs of marketing and enforce quality control. These 
boards passed world market prices to producers and also enforced exclusion of African 
farmers from markets. The boards invested in processing capacity and agricultural research 
and extension in addition to performing marketing services. 
Under the Sale of Wheat Ordinance of 1933, the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) 
became the sole legal marketer of wheat. It used this position to maintain an artificially high 
domestic price, while exporting surpluses at a lower free-market price. To maintain this 
system, a high import tariff was introduced to keep cheaper foreign wheat out of the colony. 
In a similar manner, the maize market came to be regulated with the KFA as the sole legal 
maize buyer, outside of small local markets. Because coffee growers forcefully opposed 
regulations that could increase the domestic price of maize, thus raising their labor costs, the 
KFA administered maize markets in such a way as to stabilize local prices and provide 
services to growers without imposing a high tax on consumers. Annually, the KFA 
announced a price to ensure a “guaranteed minimum return” to producers and used its market 
position to deliver (subsidized) crop-secured loans in cash or inputs. The maize purchase 
price was typically set between import and export parity. It thus shielded consumers from 
high import prices, but ensured profitable production for European settler farmers given the 
prices charged for inputs. 
Starting in 1955, the colonial government began an effort to develop a class of 
African commercial farmers. The government’s Swynnerton Plan initiated a partial 
liberalization of the agricultural sector by allowing Africans to produce crops for export. The 
Swynnerton Plan also introduced a system of land registration and titling for Africans, while 
continuing to exclude them from owning farms in the “White Highlands”. In addition to 
removing cropping restrictions, policy at this point included substantial investment in 
infrastructure and extension to serve the nascent smallholder commercial farm sector as well 
as the estate sector. While allowing broader access to markets, the state continued to 
administer prices for major commodities through marketing boards. 
At independence the Kenyan government maintained a supportive stance towards 
export agriculture and expanded efforts to commercialize smallholder production. At the 
same time, an indigenous Kenyan elite entered into large-scale agricultural production. In 
contrast to many other African countries, Kenya refrained from imposing high implicit or 
explicit taxes on the agricultural sector in the 1960s. While government control of markets  
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expanded in the post-colonial period, prices were typically administered to pass through 
world prices to large-scale export crop farmers or to the cooperative societies representing 
smallholder producers. Similarly, the administered prices for maize and wheat were held 
above export parity but below the cif price in the main growing regions. This pricing was 
consistent with the colonial price administration (Jabara 1985). However, since commercial 
maize production became more geographically dispersed as the market came to serve surplus 
producers throughout the country, the pan-territorial pricing scheme introduced larger 
distortions in some regions than in others.  
 
 
Direct and indirect distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
The main focus of the present study’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) is on government-
imposed distortions that create a gap between actual domestic prices and what they would be 
under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural 
development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the 
effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange 
market), but it also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for 
comparative evaluation.
 This involves computing a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for 
farmers plus an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural 
tradables via the calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
This study calculates NRAs for maize, wheat, coffee, tea, sugar, export fruits and 
vegetables, and fruits and vegetables. These commodities account for about 75 percent of the 
value of agricultural production and value added. The remaining 25 percent is primarily non-
tradable beef for slaughter and raw milk, exportable cut flowers, and importable dairy 
products. In calculating the overall NRA to agriculture, prices for the nontradable residual 
commodities are assumed to be undistorted, while prices for exportables are influenced by 
exchange rate distortions and prices of importable dairy are affected by both trade protection 
and exchange rate distortions. Trade protection is measured through the trade weighted ad 
valorem tariff rates on milk and dairy reported in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006) or 
by the average applied tariff for agriculture from the Statistical Abstract of Kenya.  
Data on world prices, domestic prices, and volumes of production and trade came 
from Government of Kenya sources (primarily the Statistical Abstract of Kenya and the  
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Economic Survey), FAOSTAT, and COMTRADE.  The application was particularly 
constrained by the availability of reliable data on the appropriate margins to apply for 
processing and marketing commodities. Sources for data on these costs included Nyoro, Kiiru 
and Jayne (1999, 2004), Jayne, Myers and Nyoro (2005), World Bank (2005) and Pearson et 
al. (1994). (Additional sources are noted in the discussion of specific commodities and in the 
Appendix.) For many crops actual marketing costs are not documented for long periods of 
time. Consequently, documented costs for specific years were discounted by the CPI and 
applied to a range of up to 20 years to estimate the actual costs incurred. Even if these 
estimates of the actual costs are accurate, they include implicit taxation introduced by 
inefficiencies in the management of public and parastatal intermediaries. Because 
mismanagement of parastatal marketing boards has been an important issue in Kenya, 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s, an alternative “best practices” margin was also calculated 
and applied to estimate the commodity specific rates of assistance to farmers. These “best 
practices” are typically based on costs incurred in the sector after parastatal reforms were 
adopted. Rates of assistance to farmers (NRAs on output for farmers) are adjusted downward 
from the NRA to the commodity whenever the estimated margin charged exceeded the 
estimated “best practices” margin. This creates a wedge between the NRA on output to 
primary production (farmers) and the NRA for the commodity systems for many crops, 
notably maize and wheat, in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the likelihood of technical changes 
since the late 1950s, the “best practices” margins for the 1950s and 1960s have been inflated, 
bringing them closer to estimated actual margins in that period.  
Other areas in which data are problematic include the estimates of the appropriate 
world price (or shadow price) for agricultural outputs and the parameters for estimating 
support to the non-agricultural sectors that are used to calculate the RRA. When world prices 
are particularly difficult to establish (eg. sugar), upper and lower bounds were explored. 
Uncertainty in the RRA calculation emerges from limited information on the tradability of 
output from non-agricultural sectors and from lack of precise data on the applied tariffs, taxes 
and subsidies as well as nontariff barriers. However, direct distortions tend to be small in 
most non-agricultural sectors. Finally, the amount of non-commodity specific support that 
agriculture has received is difficult to estimate. In calculating the aggregate rates of support 
this analysis presents indicators that exclude all such support, and separate  indicators that 
treat the entire agricultural budget as assistance to the sector. 
The NRA estimates shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 reveal modest to moderate rates of 
taxation to the sector overall for most of the post-colonial period. Positive rates of assistance  
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to agricultural producers (and commensurate taxation on food consumers) in the late 
1950s/early 1960s are driven largely by high domestic prices for wheat and maize which are 
exportables for much of this period (see Appendix Table 8). The general shift towards 
taxation of agricultural production in the 1970s and through the 1980s is followed by a 
reduction in distortions from the mid-1990s and, in the last years covered here (2000-2004), 
the NRA for covered farm products is sligtly positive. 
There is considerably more variability in rates of assistance for importables than for 
other classes of commodities. The negative rates of assistance for importables in the early 
1960s arise because maize and wheat were importable in some years during this period and 
were priced below import parity (but above export parity). Maintenance of a domestic price 
within the fob-cif band in Kenya implied that maize production was supported on average in 
the 1960s, but it was taxed when maize was an importable (Table 1). Because cereals account 
for a large share of production, importables as a group were subject to negative rates of 
assistance when maize and wheat were importable. The pronounced spike in assistance to 
importables in the late 1960s (see Figure 3) reflects protection of the nascent sugar industry 
and the exportable status of maize and wheat at that time. Sugar prices have been often held 
above the international free market price and the Kenyan cif price. Since sugar was the only 
commodity designated as an importable in 1967-69, importable agriculture appears to have 
received high protection in that period. In the mid-1980s the NRA on sugar output increased 
above its level in the late 1960s and another spike in assistance to importables appears. In 
later years the support to sugar continued, but by the 1990s maize had become an importable 
commodity so the overall NRA for that class of goods is lower. 
There are three periods during which tradable agriculture and the sector in general had 
distinctly negative rates of assistance (the early years of the 1970s, of the 1980s and of the 
1990s). In each of these periods the cause of the taxation on agriculture is an overvaluation of 
the Kenya Shilling. The severe drop in the NRA on output in the early 1990s reflects the 
additional effect of unusually high world prices for maize and tea that were not matched with 
increases in farm gate prices. Excessive charges by parastatal marketing boards also 
contributed to negative NRAs in the 1980s and early 1990s. Only during the late 1970s/early 
1980s do prices for non-tradables appear highly distorted. This is a result of maize being 
treated as a non-tradable during this time, when the equilibrium price fell within the fob-cif 
band. Since the fob-cif band is wide in Kenya, the shadow price is difficult to estimate 
precisely. Consequently, there is a large margin for error on the NRA on output for maize  
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during this period. Prices for other non-tradable commodities (fruits and vegetables) were 
undistorted throughout the period. 
In contrast to the negative rates of assistance in the 1980s and early 1990s, the years 
since then have seen little price distortion outside of sugar and wheat, which are importable 
commodities and receive protection. The decline in aggregate price distortions reflects in part 
the rapid expansion of horticulture in the agricultural sector. Both tradable and non-tradable 
horticulture have become substantial shares in total production and neither of these 
commodity groups is subject to direct intervention. The only distortions that are recorded in 
the tradable fruits and vegetables sector are those that enter through currency overvaluation. 
The non-tradable fruits and vegetable sector has been assumed to be undistorted. While the 
growth in fruits and vegetables as a share of the sector mutes the level of distortion in 
aggregate, policy reforms (including exchange rate liberalization) have also brought the 
NRAs for coffee, tea and maize closer to zero in the last decade under study.  
Considering only support for tradable agriculture, the pattern is of assistance in the 
1950s and 1960s followed by taxation through the early 1990s and relatively undistorted 
prices since the mid-1990s. Treatment of non-commodity specific public spending influences 
the measured level of support, but does not alter this general impression. As Table 2 suggests, 
total agricultural spending (treated as non-commodity specific support here) has been 
between 6 and 20 percent of the value of agricultural production, averaging about 10 percent. 
The total NRA for agriculture including this support was 9 percent in the 2000-04 period. 
Excluding this spending the NRA for agriculture was only 3 percent. In either treatment, the 
agricultural sector has negative rates of assistance through most of the 1970-94 period. 
Meanwhile, non-agricultural sectors are estimated to have had trade protection that 
implies nominal rates of assistance of over 20 percent from 1960 through 1990 and gradually 
declining to less than 10 percent since then (Figure 4). Given these estimates, and treating the 
agricultural budget as support for tradable agriculture, the 5-year averages of the RRA were 
negative from the late 1960s through to the late 1990s and turned slightly positive after 2000.  
Excluding non-commodity specific spending, the RRA remains negative also through the 
2000-2004 period. 
The final three rows of Table 2 report values of three indicators  if exchange rate 
distortions are not  taken into account. They suggest that distortions in the local market for 
foreign currencies accounted for up to 10 of the negative NRA and RRA percentage points 




Distortions by commodity 
 
Coffee and tea  
The data for NRAs for coffee and tea reveal very little impact directly from agricultural 
policy. Official records of producer prices indicate that growers consistently received close to 
the export parity price converted at the official exchange rate. As Figure 5 indicates, 
deviations from export parity occurred primarily when the Kenya Shilling became overvalued 
as in the early 1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s. When the exchange rate is undistorted, 
the NRA is usually near zero. Negative NRAs that are not explained by exchange rate 
distortion can be attributed to charges by the parastatal intermediary in excess of the “best 
practices” cost estimate. 
The impression of generally modest price distortions in tea and coffee is subject to at 
least two important caveats. First, there was considerable public investment in both these 
sectors in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, both sectors received subsidized credit through the 
central government at that time. While neither of these effects is quantified in the analysis, 
their impact would be to increase the rate of assistance, bringing the NRAs closer to zero.  
A second feature of the analysis may be more misleading. The producer prices used 
are the prices paid out by the central marketing authority. These prices were paid directly to 
estate producers, but channeled through cooperatives for smallholders. Beginning after the 
coffee and tea booms of the 1970s there were repeated complaints of delayed payments to 
smallholder growers, with delays of over a year often reported. Discounting the value of 
farmer prices for these delays would make the NRAs more substantially negative in many 
instances. However, the extent and duration of actual delays are unknown.  
The deviation between the NRA to estate producers and that for smallholders may be 
more pronounced for coffee than for tea. Smallholder producers are required to use 
cooperative societies for the initial (wet) processing of the Arabica coffee. Cooperatives 
charge about twice the costs reported by estate growers for this service (World Bank 2005). 
These costs are deducted from the grower price. (As described in the Appendix, the NRA 
falls by about seven percentage points if the full cost differential is treated as a tax.) Given 
payment delays, smallholders may have faced some taxation even when the NRAs are 
positive and intermediaries, including cooperative unions and parastatal agencies, could have 
captured positive rates of assistance when the NRA is negative. 
 
Wheat and maize  
 
13
Based on shares of production and consumption, maize is the single most important 
commodity in the agricultural sector. As a result, price distortions in maize tend to drive the 
overall degree of distortion in the sector. An exception to this tendency arose during the 
coffee boom in the 1970s, when the value of coffee production briefly exceeded that of 
maize.  
Distortions to incentives for cereals production have probably been somewhat greater 
than those in coffee and tea, but are still generally modest. Until the mid-1990s, prices for 
maize and wheat were administered by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) or 
its predecessor institutions. In the case of wheat, this system implied a price that was above 
both import parity and the export parity for much of the period. Following the colonial 
administration’s lead of setting the maize price to balance a positive return to farmers with 
affordability for consumers, the administered maize prices tended to fall between export and 
import parity, at least for producers in Kitale District, a major supplier of maize for the 
country.  
During the last 50 years, population growth and some income growth have caused 
cereals demand to rise more rapidly than supply. As a result, cereal crops have gradually 
shifted from being exportable to being importable. Based on trade patterns, both maize and 
wheat were exportable products through most of the 1960s but, from the mid-1970s, wheat 
was an importable. In the case of maize, production growth was more robust, but by the 
1980s the commodity could reasonably be classified as a non-tradable, with a domestic 
equilibrium price falling somewhere within the rather wide fob-cif band. Since 1990, Kenya’s 
average position in maize has been one of a significant importer, despite occasional 
surpluses. In this analysis, wheat is treated as exportable from 1960 to 1971, save for 1962, 
and as importable from 1956 to 1959 and 1972 onwards. Maize is treated as exportable from 
1956 to 1976 except for 1961, and during 1964-66 and 1970-71. It is taken as a non-tradable 
from 1977 to 1991 and as an importable from 1992 onwards. 
This transition from exportable crop to importable crop occurred while prices were 
administered to fall within the fob-cif band. The effect of agricultural policy then was to 
subsidize maize and wheat while they were export crops. In both cases these subsidies were 
defended from international trade through import restrictions via state trade. The National 
Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) was the sole entity with the legal right to import maize 
and wheat. Tariffs were also in place, but these tariffs were suspended when large imports 
were deemed necessary. They were redundant when the NCPB simply declined to import. 
The shift to importability for wheat implied a rise in the reference price for measuring  
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distortions from the fob to the cif price. This, plus exchange rate distortions, resulted in 
implicit taxation of the commodity in the 1970s, but wheat appears to be subsidized in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. The measured protection to wheat is consistent with high applied 
import tariffs in the 1990s and after 2000. 
In contrast to wheat, the rates of assistance to maize are negative for most of the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The shift to referencing against the higher cif price implied a major 
reduction in the NRA for maize in the 1980s. This downward pressure on the NRA was 
exacerbated by marketing costs in excess of the “best practices” estimate. In the 1990s the 
market for maize was liberalized and marketing margins fell, encouraging a recovery in the 
NRA. The market has been largely undistorted since 2000. While a duty on imported maize 
exists, this duty was repeatedly suspended when the country faced substantial maize deficits. 
Undocumented trade in maize from neighboring countries has also muted the effect of the 
tariff. The combination of these factors has led to an NRA for maize that is now quite 
modest.
2  
As with coffee and tea, exchange rate distortions overwhelmed direct interventions in 
the early 1970s and early 1990s. In each of these periods there was a negative NRA for 
cereals. In other periods, the negative NRA is associated with intermediation charges in 
excess of the “best practices” margin and with the administration of the price. 
There are at least two caveats that should be made concerning the calculated NRAs 
for maize and wheat. First, pan-territorial pricing with high transportation costs implied very 
different experiences across the country. The NRAs were calculated based on transport costs 
from Kitale District, a region with a large cereals surplus (Nyoro, Kirimi, and Jayne 2004). 
However, other parts of the country would have somewhat different NRAs. Second, the 
reference price for maize in the 1980s, when the crop is classified as non-tradable, is taken as 
the average of the fob and cif prices, weighted 3 to 1 in favor of the cif price. (A simple mean 
was applied for 1978-80.) Revisions of this crude proxy to other levels within the fob-cif 
band could change the sign on the NRA. Despite these concerns, the results presented here 
are consistent with other analyses of rates of assistance to cereals in Kenya. Shapouri, 
Missiaen and Rosen (1992) report producer subsidy equivalents for maize and wheat in 
Kenya in the 1980s that are similar in levels and in patterns over time to our NRAs. 
                                                 
2 The low rates of assistance shown in this analysis are consistent with Jayne, Myers and Nyoro (2005) who 
indicate that maize prices have averaged only 2 to 3 percent above import parity over the last 15 years, despite 
the de jure 20 to 30 percent tariff.  
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Consistent with this study, the distortions they identify in the early 1980s are due to exchange 
rate misalignment while later distortions result from administered pricing of the commodities. 
 
Sugar 
In this analysis sugar has been treated as an import substitute product throughout the period. 
Although Kenya has occasionally exported large volumes of sugar, this classification is based 
on the high cost of domestic production compared to the international free market price. The 
NRAs to sugar production have varied widely through time but are now large and positive. 
These direct rates actually understate the full support this sector receives, as the government 
has made and continues to make significant investments in the sector while repeatedly 
writing off debts and providing subsidized credit.  
Estimating the NRA for sugar is complicated by distortions both within and outside of 
Kenya. Kenya has occasionally had preferential access to markets in Europe and exported 
sugar at well above the free market price. Meanwhile the country has imported sugar at a 
relatively high cost from sources in the region (primarily South Africa, Malawi and Egypt). 
Imports from these and other COMESA countries are not subject to the 100 percent tariff 
applied to other sugar exporters. Use of import unit values and export unit values from 
customs data would suggest that Kenyan producers often face an import price that is less than 
the export parity for the same quality product, and export and import parity prices that are 
above any free market level. The use of these data could suggest that Kenyan producers 
cannot compete with imports, but can compete in the export market. Rather than using 
Kenyan cif prices, one could apply a “free market” reference world price adjusted for 
shipping costs. This approximation, however, is subject to error due to quality differentials, 
variation in transportation costs, and other factors.  
Using the free market prices from the Global Economic Monitor Database, the NRA 
data indicate rates of protection in excess of 100 percent in many years. When the cif price is 
taken as the reference, the NRA figures are more modest, but still exceed 50 percent. The two 
series present a reasonable set of bounds for the assistance estimate. In calculating the 
weighted average NRA and other aggregate measures of assistance for agriculture, the lower 
bound is used.
3 The NRA estimates for sugar are comparable in size and volatility to 
                                                 
3 Appendix Figure 4 presents NRA estimates using both the cif price and the free market reference price for 
sugar adjusted for shipping costs. Only when the Kenya shilling was significantly overvalued did the NRAs 
become negative. While the cif data can be expected to understate the degree of protection, the rates indicated 
from use of the reference price cannot be defended based on actual policies.. Because sugar’s share of  
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estimates made by other analysts. Earley and Westfall (1996) report producer subsidy 
equivalents (PSEs) for Kenyan sugar as follows:      
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
-262  15 -8 97 96 63 63 -9   
These calculations confirm the impression of a pronounced increase in assistance in the mid-
1980s, as well as periods of taxation in the early 1980s and emerging again at the end of the 
decade. High measured rates of assistance to sugar are consistent with import restrictions in 
the 1970s and 1980s and with high import duties since the 1990s. The consumer tax 
equivalent on sugar is even greater than the NRA because the commodity has been subject to 
exceptionally high excise taxes in addition to the interventions mentioned above. 
  In addition to uncertainty regarding the appropriate reference price, there is 
considerable question about the best-practices and actual processing costs for sugar. 
Estimates of post-farm costs range from $100 to $300 per MT, varying by year, factory, and 
source of cane. The average cost in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries reported 
in Odek, Kegode and Ochola (2003) is $105 per MT. Given the low sucrose content of 
Kenyan cane sugar, a slightly higher than average value of $150 is used in the analysis from 
1980 onwards with a higher cost of $200 applied before 1980 to reflect lower processing 
capacity (Jackson 2004). Use of a higher cost would increase the NRA. Overall, it is clear 
that the total costs of sugar production are high in Kenya relative to other East and Southern 
African producers. Jackson (2004) places production costs for raw sugar in Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda at about $290/MT compared to $210 sugar exporters of Eastern and Southern 
Africa. The Kenya Wetlands Forum (2005) reported costs in Kenya to be 40% above costs in  
other COMESA countries. 
 
Fruits and vegetables 
Growth in horticultural production and export has been a bright spot in Kenya’s recent 
economic performance (Minot and Ngigi 2004, Voor Den Dag 2003). As mentioned above, 
exports of fruits and vegetables have recently grown from a small share of total exports to 
being a major component. Because of the significance of horticulture in the agricultural 
economy, an NRA has been calculated for the composite category of export fruits and 
vegetables.  
                                                                                                                                                        
agricultural production is small, the choice has little impact on the weighted average NRA, but has considerable 
effect on the estimated assistance to importables when maize is treated as an exportable or non-tradable.  
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The NRAs reported in Table 1 are based on the volumes and revenues from fruits and 
vegetables exports reported by the FAO and on the internal marketing margins associated 
with green beans. Green beans are the largest single fresh vegetable export (this category 
having previously been dominated by processed pineapples). 
The constructed NRA for tradable fruits and vegetables represents an estimate of the 
NRA for green beans that is scaled up to the volume of total fruits and vegetable exports. 
While this implies aggregation of such distinct products as apricots and zucchinis, the 
approach allows for inclusion of this important sector in calculation of the NRA. To ignore it 
completely would imply a measure of price distortions that failed to reflect the conditions in a 
highly dynamic part of the country’s agricultural economy. The biases implied by treating 
this diverse set of crops as one constituent part (green beans) may be small since the major 
components of the fruits and vegetables group appear to be uniformly unaffected by policy. 
The exportable fruits and vegetables sector has emerged with little policy 
intervention, but it has benefited from rural infrastructure and public investment in increased 
airfreight capacity and in extension as well as a supportive macro-economic policy 
environment. While trade restrictions do prohibit the import of certain horticultural crops, the 
bulk of fruit and vegetable exports have not been subsidized or protected directly. For all of 
these commodities, the main distortions to producer incentives have been indirect, through 
occasional currency overvaluation. Fruits and vegetables do face a 1 percent cess for services 
from the Horticulture Development Authority.  
The great majority of fruits and vegetables grown in Kenya are destined for domestic 
markets and either do not meet standards of or lack access to international markets (Muendo, 
Tschirley, and Weber 2004). Data from FAOSTAT suggest that by weight only about 5 
percent of Kenyan vegetable production and about 7.5 percent of fruit production is exported. 
The non-export production sells at a much lower price in largely unregulated (and 
undistorted) markets. While there are import duties on horticultural products from Uganda 
and Tanzania, these duties are unlikely to be relevant given the porous nature of the borders 
and the high costs to long distance transportation of the commodities. Because production of 
non-tradable fruits and vegetables has expanded rapidly and now accounts for a large share of 
the agricultural sector, the RRA calculation for this study includes an estimate of the NRA for 
non-tradable fruits and vegetables.  
Tomatoes, onions, kale, and cooking bananas constitute about half of the value of 
domestically consumed vegetables and fruits (Ayieko, Tschirley and Mathenge 2005). 
Evidence in Muendo, Tschirley, and Weber (2004) suggests the total value of domestically  
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traded fruits and vegetables is about three times the value of the exported counterparts. 
Argwings-Kodhek (2005) estimate the agricultural value added from the domestic 
horticulture sector to be similar in level to that of export fruits and vegetables plus 
floriculture. Further, based on Muendo, Tschirley and Weber (2004), we set the price of the 
domestic products to be about half of the price of the export version of the same product. 
Since the non-traded crops tend to be bulky, lower priced goods (potatoes rather than green 
beans), the price per kilogram of the non-traded vegetables and fruits group is set at 15 
percent of the price in the exportable sector. At this price, the value of the non-tradable fruits 
and vegetables is about 1.5 to 2 times that of their export counterparts. These prices are 
assumed to be completely undistorted by policy. Their inclusion in the analysis therefore 
tends to bring the calculated total NRA for covered farm products towards zero, but has no 
effect on the calculated rates of assistance in the importable and exportable sub-groups. 
 
 
Policies behind the distortions since 1960 
 
 
Kenyan agriculture benefited from a supportive policy environment during the first 20 years 
of independence. Unlike their counterparts in other African countries, the Kenyan political 
elite had strong agricultural interests at independence. Government interventions supported 
both the estate sector and smallholder production. Through the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA) and other institutions significant investments were made to facilitate 
smallholder production of export agriculture. Pressure for efficient operation of these public 
enterprises in agriculture can probably be explained by the coincidence of interests of the 
numerous smallholders and the politically important estate producers (Jabara 1985, Bates 
1989). 
The policy stance towards cereals has been somewhat more complicated as the 
country has historically tried to balance demands for low cost maize with support for 
producers. Until 1996, maize and wheat prices were administered by a parastatal, the 
National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) and enforced by the state. The NCPB also 
controlled all import and export of maize and all long-distance trade within the country. In 
general, prices were held within the fob-cif band for the major cereals producing region 
(Kitale District). However, the combination of high transportation costs and pan-territorial 
pricing meant that some producers received prices outside of their local fob-cif band. In some  
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instances, when the NCBP found itself unable to cover the costs of serving specific regions, it 
failed to open buying centers or to deliver maize for consumers (Bates 1989, Pearson et al. 
1994). 
Price administration allowed the NCPB to deduct its intermediation costs from the 
wholesale prices and provided little incentive to control those costs. Since liberalization of 
the maize market in 1996, marketing margins appear to have fallen considerably for maize. 
Based on Nyoro, Kirimi and Jayne (2004), costs of moving maize from Kitale District to 
Nairobi have dropped from about $400/MT to $200/MT. The main beneficiaries of this 
decline have probably been the consumers (Argwings-Kodhek, Mukumbu and Monke 1993, 
Nyoro, Kiiri and Jayne 1999, Nyoro, Kirimi and Jayne 2004). The present analysis uses 
marketing margins from the post-reform period to estimate best practices margins. Thus, 
excess charges by the NCPB are treated as a tax amounting to 50 percent of the margin that 
was charged, and lowering the farmer NRA. The liberalization of maize markets seems fairly 
thorough now, although the NCPB does influence prices through maintenance of stabilization 
stocks. Moreover, the route to liberalization was slow. In 1988 limited unlicensed maize trade 
was allowed. In 1992 the liberalization process was practically halted, and finally in 1996 the 
NCPB was significantly downsized. Despite increased competition from private traders, the 
NCPB remains a major player in the Kenyan maize market. Jayne, Myers, and Nyoro (2005) 
present analysis suggesting that maize purchasing by the NCPB supported domestic producer 
prices in 2002, when they otherwise may have fallen significantly. Their analysis suggests 
that the NCPB may be serving to maintain a price floor, in contrast to its earlier tendency to 
impose a producer tax. 
In contrast to maize, the NRA on wheat has been increasing recently and suggsts 
significant price distortion. Like maize, the domestic wheat market has been liberalized, but 
imports of both cereals have been subject to tariffs of 35 percent. The maize tariff has been 
suspended repeatedly when large imports are required, and Jayne et al. (2001) suggest that 
maize smuggling has diminished the impact of the tariff. Tariffs on wheat, in contrast, have 
not been suspended and informal trade flows are unlikely to be large. From a political 
economy perspective, the difference between the treatment of maize and wheat could be 
explained by the fact that maize is grown primarily by smallholders and is consumed as a 
staple, while wheat is grown primarily on estates and is consumed less widely. 
Like cereals, coffee and tea markets have been administered by parastatal bodies. The 
Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) and the Coffee Board of Kenya with the Kenya 
(coffee) Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU) have had a policy of passing through to farmers  
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the world price minus processing and marketing costs. In general, producer prices appeared 
to be close to export parity calculated at the official exchange rate. However, both coffee and 
tea producers complained of long delays in payments which imply a reduction in the real 
price received. These delays may be attributable to the local cooperative societies through 
which smallholder production was channeled in addition to the national organizations. The 
NRA data reported here are based on payments by the KTDA and the Coffee Board of 
Kenya, and so do not reflect local deductions made by cooperative societies.  
The system of pass-through pricing implied little incentive to hold intermediation 
costs down. Payment delays may have been partly a mechanism for covering rising costs of 
intermediation by reducing the real prices paid to farmers (Pearson et al. 1994). 
Liberalization and privatization have progressed to a degree for Kenyan tea and coffee. The 
KTDA has been replaced with a private body, the Kenya Tea Development Agency. The 
estimated NRA for tea takes the costs incurred by the private agency as an estimate of best 
practice for calculating the marketing margins. Using this estimate, tea is subject to slight 
taxation on average over the period and is currently undistorted. If a more generous margin is 
assumed, set at the average costs incurred in the late 1980s, tea would appear to be 
undistorted on average over the last 40 years, but to be subsidized at present. Given the 
absence of any policy to explain the subsidy and the likelihood of some inefficiency in the 
earlier administration, the NRA based on “best practices” seems preferable.  
For coffee the implicit taxation through the deviations from best practices appears to 
be larger than for tea. The cost figures used suggest $100/MT for final processing and 
marketing of Arabica coffee. Costs charged over time have ranged from $25 to $800 with an 
average well over the “best practices” figure. Coffee marketing has also been liberalized with 
the Coffee Board playing a reduced role. However, liberalization of the coffee system is a 
continuing process. Through 2006, coffee growers were critical of requirements that all 
Kenyan coffee to pass through the Coffee Board auction, because they felt that the system 
precluded access to the highest prices available through direct contracting. This problem may 
have been particularly serious for the highest quality and specialty coffees. Further criticisms 
suggested that coffee producers are being forced to work through the Coffee Board when 
more innovative and lower cost intermediation may be possible. In a sign of government 
responsiveness, starting in January 2007 coffee cooperatives were allowed to directly market 
coffee to international dealers, avoiding the Coffee Board auction for the first time. 
In contrast to coffee and tea, sugar policy in Kenya has been highly distortionary. 
Sugar prices have been administered at a level well above the free market price, imports of  
 
21
sugar have been taxed heavily and subjected to quotas, and consumers of sugar have faced 
high excise taxes. While liberalization is fairly well advanced in cereals, tea and coffee 
markets, the sugar market remains tightly controlled by the state. Because farm level costs are 
high in many of the sugar growing areas, some of the assistance to the sector is passed onto 
farmers to support production. However, sugar factories are well-positioned to capture a large 
share of the subsidy to the sector. Currently Kenya demands about 200,000 MT of sugar in 
excess of domestic production. Imports from outside the COMESA region are subject to a 
120 percent tariff. A quota of approximately 100,000 MT of table sugar and 100,000 MT of 
refined sugar limits duty free imports from COMESA countries. The quota on imports from 
COMESA is allowed under a protective provision that was due to expire in February 2008, 
but the Government of Kenya was seeking to extend this protective quota provision to 2011. 
After that time Kenyan sugar industry may be subject to competition from lower-cost sources 
in the COMESA region (FAO 2007, Export Processing Zones Authority 2005). 
The liberalization of Kenya’s agricultural sector was a priority of the international 
financial institutions (World Bank 1998). Kenya agreed to numerous adjustment lending 
programs in the 1980s and 1990s which stressed liberalization and privatization. The 
country’s compliance with those programs was often poor. Nonetheless, once the national 
leadership was convinced of the need for reform (or its inevitability) and found politically 
acceptable mechanisms for introducing reform, the liberalization program gathered speed. 
The success of liberalization of maize markets and of markets for agricultural inputs attests to 
the potential for further gains in areas that remain controlled. 
 
Fiscal and trade policy 
 
Historically, the Government of Kenya has relied on excise taxes, income taxes and import 
duties for revenues. The mix has been complicated but trade taxes are becoming decreasingly 
important as a source of revenue. Export duties were largely eliminated in the 1970s and 
tariffs have played a decreasing role since the introduction of a VAT system in 1989 (Karinga 
and Wanjala 2005, Muriithi and Moyi 2003). Import duties accounted for almost 40 percent 
of tax revenue in the 1960s, falling to about 25 percent in the 1970s and to about 16 percent 
since the value added tax was introduced. Excise duties continue to bring about 16 percent of 
government revenue, as they did in the 1960s, while income taxes have consistently 
accounted for about one-third of revenue.   
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The VAT now accounts for 25 to 30 percent of government revenue. It was initially 
differentiated into 15 categories with rates ranging from zero to 150 percent. It was soon 
simplified to a system of 4 (and later 3) categories ranging from zero to 16 percent with a 
standard rate of 16 percent. In addition a few goods, including sugar, remain subject to excise 
taxes. Both imported and domestically produced goods are subject to the same VAT rates. 
Imports, however, are subject to separate import duties. Thus the tax on imported sugar from 
non-COMESA sources includes both an import duty of 120 percent and a development duty 
of 7 percent in addition to the 16 percent VAT charged on all non-cereal agricultural 
products. 
Average import tariffs have been falling in Kenya (Appendix Figure 5). This reflects 
efforts to comply with WTO as well as a strategy since the mid-1970s of reducing import 
tariffs of industrial inputs in order to increase the effective protection of manufacturing 
sector. While average tariffs have been falling, tariffs on agricultural products have risen over 
the past 15 years. Average tariff rates on food and livestock are now about 35 percent, with 
much higher rates on sugar and a few other specific agricultural products. 
While the trend in increased applied import duties in agriculture appears pronounced, 
it is not clear how great the practical implications are. Since trade in most agricultural 
products was controlled by parastatal organizations for most of the period 1955-90, non-tariff 
barriers to imports were the more relevant source of distortion. Partly in response to WTO 
and IFI pressures, the non-tariff barriers have been replaced with tariffs. The trend in the 
calculated NRA towards zero would suggest that the current applied tariffs in agriculture 
have less impact than the non-tariff barriers of the past. Be that as it may, the applied tariffs 
are distorting for specific crops (e.g., wheat) and uncertainty about the application of tariffs 
may negatively impact potential importers of maize. 
 
Regulation, red tape and rent seeking 
 
Over the last 20 years Kenya has preserved a large state presence in much of the economy 
and has also developed a reputation for corruption. Allegations and evidence of fraud and 
corruption have at times been particularly strong in the area of customs and international 
trade. The abundance of red tape and the possibility of corruption among those administering 
paperwork raise transactions costs and create inefficiencies in the economy that are not 
captured in this analysis. According to www.doingbusiness.org, importing into Kenya in 
2005 required 13 documents, 20 signatures, and 62 days compared to 9 signatures and 34  
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days in South Africa and 10 signatures and 25 days in Thailand. Exporting from Kenya 
requires 15 official signatures and 45 days, compared to 7 signatures and 31 days in South 
Africa and 10 signatures and 23 days in Thailand.  
Many of the regulations in the Kenyan economy are perceived to foster corruption 
and rent seeking, further raising transactions costs. The “corruption perception index” 
published by Transparency International ranked Kenya 144 out of 158 countries in 2005. This 
placed Kenya in a tie with Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Apparent 
improprieties in the 2007 presidential election reinforced the impression of corruption in the 
country. Even if corrupt practices were controlled in Kenya, the relatively onerous paperwork 
requirements constitute an impediment to trade and economic growth. Initiatives are now in 
progress in Kenya to create a fast track that would remove license requirements in the 
absence of environmental, health, and safety considerations. Moreover, the 2006 report 






The Kenyan economy has historically benefited from good performance in agriculture, while 
the agricultural sector has benefited from a political elite that had strong rural links, largely 
through the estate sector. In the recent past, agricultural production has faltered, the economy 
in general has suffered, and poverty has spread. While direct taxation of the agricultural 
sector does not seem to have been a substantial factor in this decline, indirect taxation 
through currency overvaluation played a role. Other policy factors that probably contributed 
to the decline in the sector include growing domestic marking margins, which are due to both 
poor infrastructure services and high costs in the parastatal marketing enterprises. One 
explanation for the government’s tolerance of these raising costs in the agricultural sector 
could be that the political elite found it increasingly attractive to use agricultural marketing 
institutions and monetary policy to serve short-term political goals including redistribution, 
employment, and patronage rather than long-term economic development (Bates 1981).  
Sound public investment in developing the horticulture sector indicates that the 
Government of Kenya is willing to make strategic moves to enhance agricultural output. 
Meanwhile heavy investment in sugar and continued protection of the sector suggests that  
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agricultural policy will continue to be used to affect politically important distributional 
objectives.  
Policy reforms to liberalize the agricultural markets were made in the hopes of 
reducing marketing margins and increasing agricultural output. In the case of maize markets, 
in which the NCPB now plays a much-reduced role, this goal was achieved. Marketing 
margins have fallen by half compared to the pre-reform period, and consumer prices have 
fallen as a result. There is less evidence of such reductions in marketing margins or a shift 
towards competitive and open markets in the case of coffee, tea and sugar. However, the 
loosening of administrative regulations restricting trade and marketing systems is 
encouraging.  
Further expansion of the agricultural sector probably requires public investments in 
areas of potential comparative advantage (such as horticulture), continued policy reforms to 
reduce the costs of doing business, and maintanance of a stable macro-economic environment 
to encourage private investment. Whether policy makers in Kenya will find such policies in 
their interests remains to be seen, but the current political debate and recent administrative 
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Figure 1: Agricultural value added, marketed production, and national income, Kenya, 
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Source: World Development Indicators Online and Government of Kenya, Statistical 




Figure 2: Agricultural production and consumption shares by farm product, Kenya, 1960 to 
2004  
(percent, five year averages). 
 












































Sources: FAOSTAT, and Government of Kenya, Statistical Abstract of Kenya  (various years).   
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 





Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1956-59 1960-64 1965-69
  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
            
Exportables 
a, b  25.5 16.8 3.3 -16.3 -2.3 -13.0 -14.1 -26.6 -10.5 -0.6 
Coffee  -10.7 -0.4 -12.7 -19.4 -4.3 -15.2 -14.8 -21.9 -5.0 -3.3 
Tea  2.6 11.5 -6.7 -15.6 -1.0 -10.2 -13.0 -29.5 -14.9 0.2 
Vegetables and fruits – tradable   n.a. -1.3 -12.5 -21.5 -6.7 -14.8 -7.4 -12.8 -3.2 0.0 
            
Import-competing products
a, b  12.3 -16.6 4.2 -46.0 -25.3 -40.5 16.1 -35.4 2.9 9.3 
   
Nontradables
a  0.0 8.0 0.0 -5.5 -19.1 -44.2 -1.3 -6.0 0.0 0.0 
Vegetables and fruits – nontradable  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   
Mixed trade status
a   
Wheat  12.3 5.1 10.1 -26.8 -7.7 -20.5 18.6 -10.7 36.8 46.2 
Maize  59.4 44.3 13.1 -24.1 -17.2 -46.4 -1.3 -34.5 -5.3 0.5 
Vegetables and fruits – tradable  n.a. -1.0 -9.9 -17.4 -5.3 -11.8 -5.8 -10.5 -2.5 0.0 
Sugar  n.a. -29.1 42.7 -47.9 -24.6 -47.9 21.1 -27.1 30.6 36.5 
   
Total of covered products
a  23.7 15.8 -2.3 -24.1 -14.7 -29.9 -8.0 -30.0 -4.5 3.7 
Dispersion of covered products    30.5 25.8 32.7 20.2 25.7 23.9 20.4 21.7 18.7 19.1 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  64 66 70 79 82 85 81 85 80 78 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.   
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Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1956-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products  23.7 15.8 -2.3 -24.1 -14.7 -29.9 -8.0 -30.0 -4.5 3.7 
Non-covered products   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -1.2 -0.3 0.0 
All agricultural products  15.2 10.1 -2.2 -19.2 -12.3 -25.7 -6.6 -26.8 -3.7 2.9 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   11.4 12.8 11.9 7.5 10.7 7.1 17.2 21.0 6.1 6.4 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
a  26.6 23.0 9.7 -11.8 -1.7 -18.6 10.5 -5.8 2.4 9.3 
Trade bias index
c  0.12 0.18 0.09 0.64 0.48 0.57 -0.24 0.31 -0.12 -0.09 
            
Assistance to just tradables:            
   All agricultural tradables  41.5 37.7 15.7 -13.3  11.8 -6.5 20.3 -4.3 3.1  12.3 
   All non-agricultural tradables  20.0 21.9 29.2 24.5 20.0 33.2 28.3 18.0 13.8 10.3 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b  17.9  12.7  -10.4 -30.2 -6.9  -29.9 -6.1  -18.7 -9.3  1.9 
            
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:            
  NRA, all agricultural products  26.9 23.4 15.6 -3.4 1.2  -15.3  13.5 -4.6 3.0  9.3 
  Trade bias index
c  0.13 0.20 0.28 1.19 0.62 0.92 -0.16  0.64 -0.08  -0.09 
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
b  18.4  13.7  0.4  -16.3 -1.4  -21.4 0.2  -15.5 -8.1  1.9 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (percent). 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
c. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. Appendix: Data sources, time series construction, and sensitivity analysis 
 
Data for calculating nominal rates of assistance to commodities and the RRA to the 
agricultural sector are incomplete and often contradictory. This appendix documents the 
sources of data for the analysis, methods used for constructing data, and methods used to 
reconcile data that were contradictory. Simple sensitivity analysis is presented to indicate 
the robustness of the results in the face of concerns about data quality. Additional 




There has been no effort to include input prices or input price distortions in this analysis. 
Throughout the period in question, fertilizer and other agricultural inputs were free from 
import duty. Through much of the period prior to liberalization (1993), targeted 
agricultural finance subsidized credit and made fertilizer available at a below-market rate 
to some growers. Coffee growers, for example, received credit for inputs through the 
Second Coffee Improvement Program (SCIP). Subsidized credit and fertilizer were 
rationed. Under such rationing, it is reasonable to conclude that input prices were 
subsidized to some growers but that inputs were unavailable for others.  
Fertilizers were distributed through various commodity support programs (Kenya 
Tea Development Association, SCIP) and contract farming schemes (eg. sugar and 
tobacco). Well documented inefficiencies in the controlled distribution systems imply 
that on average inputs faced a tax through excessive marketing margins. Indicative of the 
scale of this tax, Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro (2006) report that marketing margins for 
fertilizers dropped from Ksh 262/ton over 1990-95 (pre-reform) to Ksh 137/ton during 
2003-05. However, this implicit tax prior to liberalization was off-set for some growers 
when credit schemes (including that of the SCIP) collapsed and debts for inputs were 
written off. Limited information on input use rates and on the size of this tax as well as 
the distribution of subsidized finance and fertilizer prevent incorporation of input price 




Data on exchange rates are based on official rates reported in the WDI and on parallel 
market rates compiled by Easterly and distributed through the Poverty Alleviation 
Through Reducing Distortions to Agricultural Incentives project of the World Bank. The 
parallel market rate for the period 1957-63 is estimated based on differential inflation 
rates in Kenya and the United Kingdom. These rates suggested little change in the degree 
of exchange rate distortion over the 1957-65 period. In the NRA calculations it is 
assumed that exporters are able to exchange 25 percent of their foreign exchange on the 
parallel market. This implies consistent evasion of legal processes. The assumption is 
made in the absence of any data. For most of the period, the degree of exchange rate 
distortion is sufficiently modest that results cannot be influenced by the assumed share of 
foreign exchange flowing into the parallel market. During periods of macro-economic  
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distortions (mid-1970s, early 1980s, early 1990s) this parameter is more important, but 




Data on volumes of maize traded and on export and import unit values were taken from 
FAOSTAT, Comtrade, and from the Government of Kenya’s Statistical Abstract, and its 
Economic Survey. In most cases these data sources were consistent. When one source 
diverged from the others, the value on which two sources agreed was used. During the 
periods when maize was not traded in large quantities, the export price from South Africa 
reported in FAOSTAT was used as a reference price. A charge of $15/ton was applied for 
shipping costs.  
Data on the volume of production since 1961 were taken from FAOSTAT. Data 
for earlier years are based on the volume of marketed production reported in the 
Statistical Abstract, adjusted upwards to account for on-farm consumption and informal 
trade. Data on producer prices were taken from the Statistical Abstract. Retail prices are 
reported in the Statistical Abstract for unmilled maize in Nairobi. Milling is not included 
in the analysis. 
Marketing margins applied to the producer price cover the costs of moving maize 
from farms in a major production region (Kitale) to Nairobi. Fob and cif prices are 
adjusted by transport costs between Mombasa and Nairobi. Data from Jayne, Myers and 
Nyoro (2005) suggest that transportation costs are approximately equivalent along these 
two routes.  
Over the time frame studied, Kenya moved from being consistently maize surplus 
to being maize deficit. For a number of years in the interim, the country sometimes had 
large surpluses to sell, sometimes required large imports and occasionally had negligible 
trade. During this time, producer and consumer prices were administered and typically 
held within the fob-cif band. Because of high inland transportation costs, this band is 
rather wide. With a domestic price within this band, the classification of the country as an 
importer or an exporter will produce the impression of either a large subsidy or a large 
tax on producers. In the baseline analysis used here, the country has been classified as a 
maize exporter for most years up to 1979 and as a maize importer since 1992. In the 
interim years maize is classified as a non-tradable on the grounds that the country was 
roughly self-sufficient in the crop during this period, with the average equilibrium price 
falling in the fob-cif band. To estimate the undistorted price during this period, fob and 
cif prices are constructed from trade data and the average of those values is taken as the 
reference price. 
Trade status based on the rule-of-thumb suggested in Anderson et al (2008), is 
reported in Appendix Table 1 under “Trade Classification: Varied”. Using this 
classification, the reference price varies widely during the 1979-1992 period and the 
measured NRA for maize is somewhat different from what is reported in the main text. 
Appendix Table 1 reports the NRA using the more variable set of reference prices and the 
prices based on the smoothed tradability classification. As the data show, the NRA using 
the more varied trade classification is highly unstable. Moreover, it suggests rates of 
assistance in the late 1980s that are exceedingly high and inconsistent with policies in 
place at the time.  
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The marketing margins for maize since the early 1990s have been subject of many 
careful analyses through the Tegemeo Institute of Egerton University, Kenya. These 
papers (cited in the main text) suggest a steady decline in margins since liberalization of 
domestic trade. Data for earlier periods are scarce. The administered prices were intended 
to allow mark-ups along the value chain that equaled the costs of intermediation. Recent 
experience suggests those costs were inflated, at least immediately prior to reform. 
During the period of the analysis there were forces leading to lower marketing costs, such 
as use of larger vehicles for road transport between Nairobi and Kitale. Meanwhile, 
deterioration for the rail service probably led to increasing costs on the Mombasa-Nairobi 
route. The NRA calculations for maize assume that the low costs of intermediation 
experienced since reform could have been achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. A slightly 
higher intermediation cost is applied from the late 1950s through the early 1970s. Actual 
charges in excess of the estimated costs are treated as a tax on producers that is 
transferred to the marketing agents. Appendix Table 1 presents the “best practice” 
marketing margin used in the baseline analysis and the actual mark up charged under the 
administered pricing system and during the years immediately following liberalization. 
The difference between these two charges is treated as a tax on producers in the baseline 
NRA calculation. The NRA that emerges if one assumed that the actual marketing margin 
covered only the costs of efficient intermediation is given in the last column of Appendix 
Table 1. These results suggest a tax (subsidy) that is as much as 25 percentage points 
lower (higher) than the baseline during the 1980s. The divergence between the two series 




Data on volumes of wheat traded and on export or import unit values were taken from 
FAOSTAT, Comtrade, and from the Government of Kenya’s Statistical Abstract, and its 
Economic Survey. Export volumes and unit values were consistent across these sources, 
but import volumes and values sometimes diverged (Appendix Table 2). When one 
source diverged from the others, as in 1980 and 1998, the value on which two sources 
agreed was used. 
Data on volume of production was taken from the Statistical Abstract and from 
FAOSTAT. As Appendix Table 2 shows, these data were consistent up to the mid-1980s, 
but diverge dramatically after that point. The analysis uses the FAOSTAT series. Since 
wheat has a relatively high, positive NRA in most years and the FAOSTAT series shows 
much larger production than the GOK data, use of the GOK data would tend to lower the 
NRA to agriculture.  
Data on producer prices were taken from the Statistical Abstract. Retail prices are 
reported in the Statistical Abstract for wheat flour in Nairobi. However, the reference 
prices in calculating rates of assistance are for wheat grain. The commodity is not treated 
as a processed good. 
Marketing margins cover the costs of moving wheat from farms in a major 
production region to Nairobi and from Mombasa to Nairobi, when the country is wheat 
deficit, or Nairobi to Mombasa when the country is wheat surplus. Data from Jayne, 
Myers and Nyoro (2005) suggest that transportation costs are approximately equivalent 
along these two routes. Costs of domestic marketing of wheat were assumed to be the  
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same in absolute value as those for maize. The percentage mark-up for wheat is lower 




Data on volumes of coffee traded and on export unit values were taken from FAOSTAT 
and from the Government of Kenya’s Statistical Abstract and its Economic Survey. 
Export volumes and unit values differed by less than one percent in all but three years 
between 1961 and 1994. During this period the difference was never greater than five 
percent. After 1994 there is a much wider divergence between the export unit values 
calculated using FAO and GOK data. The FAO data are used because they seem more 
consistent with general trends in the global market. FAOSTAT data suggested unrealistic 
variation in domestic consumption of coffee in the 1980s and onwards. In constructing 
the spreadsheets, the domestic consumption data were smoothed and the storage values 
adjusted accordingly. Since coffee represents a small share of consumption, there is little 
impact on the calculated consumer subsidy equivalent from this manipulation of the data. 
Almost all of Kenya’s coffee is Arabica, and about 50 percent is grown by 
smallholders with the other half produced on large estates. Producers harvest coffee 
cherries which are pulped and dried into parchment. Pulping is done on-farm for estate 
producers and at cooperative societies for smallholders. The parchment is then milled at 
factories into clean coffee (also known as green coffee) and exported through the Coffee 
Board of Kenya’s auction. For most of the period, all coffee was milled at the Kenya 
Planters Cooperative Union factory in Nairobi.  
Prices are reported in terms of clean coffee equivalent, except at the retail level. 
Producers deliver parchment coffee, which is converted to clean coffee with a conversion 
factor of 1.25 to 1. Marketing margins for moving parchment coffee from pulper to mill 
are based on Pearson et al. (1994) who report data for 1989. These costs are a very small 
share of the revenue and so results are not sensitive to this value. Costs of light 
processing and marketing are taken from World Bank (2005). This document sets costs of 
milling at US$62-65 per ton and costs of onward marketing at US$50 per ton. By 
comparison, Temu (2002) reports milling costs in Tanzania at $50/ton in 1999.The World 
Bank data are used to estimate costs in the analysis. Retail prices are for roasted coffee 
and come from the Statistical Abstract of Kenya. The retail margin includes the costs of 
roasting and packaging beans.  
World Bank (2005) indicates that cooperative pulping implies a charge of about 
Ksh 15/kg above the costs incurred in estate pulping. If these extra charges result from 
poor management, rather than the intrinsic difficulties of pooling from multiple 
smallholders, the differential in markup can be treated as a tax. In the baseline analysis, 
the producer rate of assistance is based on payments to estate producers and to 
cooperative societies. Thus, it assumes that cooperatives make no excess charges on 
smallholders. If one assumes that the differential charges for pulping are unjustified, then 
a separate NRA must be calculated for smallholders and for estate producers. Appendix 
Table 3 presents NRA estimates for smallholders, assuming that they face an excess 
charge amounting to 10 percent of the producer price to estates and the baseline NRA, 
representing the NRA to estate producers.   
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Separate treatment of smallholder coffee in the analysis would imply that a 
substantial share of coffee production faced a negative NRA that is eight to ten 
percentage points lower than what is suggested in the baseline analysis (Appendix Table 
3). Smallholder coffee has been about 50 percent of total production since the 1970s and 
coffee was a large share of total production up to about 2000. Thus, separate treatment of 
smallholders would imply a lower NRA to agriculture during the 1970s through 2000, but 
it would not change the general patterns of assistance through time. Given uncertainty 
about the degree to which the higher charges on smallholder pulping are justified, the 




Data on volumes of tea produced and traded and on export unit values were taken from 
FAOSTAT and from the Government of Kenya’s Statistical Abstract and its Economic 
Survey. Data on export and production volumes were consistent across the sources. 
Calculated export unit values were also consistent, except in 1998 and 2001 when the 
FAO data indicate unit values of 15 percent and 25 percent above the GOK reports. Data 
on export prices in Mombasa provided by the World Bank were close to those reported 
by the GOK. Therefore, the GOK data on export unit values were used throughout the 
period. FAOSTAT data were used for volumes produced and exported. As with coffee, 
FAOSTAT data suggested unrealistic variation in domestic consumption of tea. In 
constructing the spreadsheets, the domestic consumption data were smoothed and the 
storage values from FAOSTAT were adjusted accordingly. Since tea represents a small 
share of consumption, there is little impact on the calculated consumer subsidy equivalent 
from this manipulation of the data.  
Data on marketing and processing costs for tea are scarce. The Statistical Abstract 
of Kenya provides an estimate of the total costs between the farm gate and the London 
auction during the 1950s and 1960s. Fifty percent of this value is taken as an estimate of 
the costs of light processing and transportation to Mombasa from 1957 to 1965. These 
costs are assumed to increase at 2.5 percent a year from 1965 to 1975. The rising costs 
are meant to capture the effect of increased smallholder production and implied 
additional costs for collection, distribution, and processing. Pearson et al. (1994) provide 
a cost for coffee processing in 1988. This value is used as the basis for estimating costs 
from 1976-2000. The average cost charged from 2000 to 2005 is used as the estimated 
cost for that period. To estimate the “best practices” marketing margin, the average costs 




This analysis covers only sugar that is produced and delivered for processing in domestic 
refineries. FAOSTAT reports total sugar cane production while the Government of 
Kenya’s Statistical Abstract reports volumes of sugar delivered for processing. For the 
period 1965-95 the FAOSTAT data exceed the GOK values by 15 to 25 percent. This 
differential may indicate the quantity of sugar that is processed informally or consumed 
as cane. From 1996 on the two series are identical. The analysis assumes that the GOK 
data accurately measures sugar cane delivered to factories throughout the period, while 
the residual production is not consistently captured. The GOK data are used in the  
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analysis to gauge volume. Where import unit values were used to estimate the cif price, 
the data from FAOSTAT were used. As shown in Appendix Table 4, the GOK and FAO 
data were similar in most years. When they differ, as in 1991 and 1992, the FAO data 
seem more reasonable and more consistent with world market conditions. Methods for 
selecting prices used in the RRA calculation are described in the main text of this report. 
Annual data are reported in Appendix Table 4. Retail price data and excise tax collection 
data were taken from the Statistical Abstract. 
 
Fruits and vegetables 
 
Data sources and methods for calculating the NRA values for export and non-tradable 
fruits and vegetables are described in the main text. 
 
Other agricultural activities 
 
The main agricultural activities that are not explicitly treated in the RRA calculation are 
floriculture, meat and dairy. Appendix Table 5 presents the value of marketed production 
for selected agricultural products as well as the total value of marketed production. For 
reasons explained in the main text, these data understate the value of maize production 
and horticulture production. However, they do confirm the significance of animal 
products. 
In the analysis, floriculture is treated as an exportable with negligible domestic 
consumption. Up to 1980, the share of dairy production that is processed into packaged 
milk or butter is also considered exportable. After that time, this production is treated as 
importable. The analysis also adds a negligible value for other exportable production, 
reflecting minor exports of sisal and a few other products. The great majority of Kenyan 
meat is slaughtered in small facilities and is not inspected. This production is considered 
non-tradable. Slaughtering and butchering activities are treated as a marketing function 




The rates of assistance to non-agricultural sectors are calculated using the 
assumptions that non-tradable production is non-distorted and that the primary distortions 
to tradable production is through the exchange rate and import tariffs. Shares of 
production to manufacturing, services and non-agricultural primary production are based 
on value added data from the World Development Indicators. Shares of each of these 
sectors that are importable, exportable or non-tradable are estimated with reference to 
data from the Statistical Abstract. Tariff rates are taken from the Statistical Abstract. To 
be consistent with the rest of the country studies in this project, the NRA for non-
agriculture relates only to tradable goods (not services). Importable manufacturing and 
non-agricultural primary production are protected at the average tariff rates provided in 
the Statistical Abstract of Kenya. The division over exportable, importable and non-
tradable in these sectors was based on little data or knowledge. But the RRA estimates 
turn out to be robust to changes in the non-agricultural NRA.   
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Appendix Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to import-competing crops (wheat and 
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Source: Calculated from Statistical Abstract of Kenya (various years).  
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Appendix Table 1: Maize data and alternate NRA calculations, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
 
Marketing 









Imports as % 
of 
Consumption
Exports as % 
of  
Production  Varied Smoothed fob 
Imputed 








1956 385  0.29  0.28 0.00  0.56  H  X  57.76  n.a.  n.a.  0.54  0.54  0.52 
1957 418  0.27  0.26 0.00  2.80  X  X  56.49  n.a.  n.a.  0.64  0.64  0.63 
1958 385  0.29  0.29 0.01  10.42  X  X  52.16  n.a.  n.a.  0.72  0.72  0.72 
1959 307.78  0.36  0.39  0.01  5.89  X  X  54.95 n.a.  n.a.  0.48 0.48  0.51 
1960 359.59  0.31  0.34  0.00  1.08  H  X  52.87 n.a.  n.a.  0.63 0.63  0.67 
1961 390.5  0.28  0.32  9.97  0.14  M  M 61.54  53.06 63.10  -0.16  -0.15  -0.12 
1962  319.3 0.35  0.40  2.40  5.49  X  X  47.02  51.31  57.81 0.76  0.76  0.82 
1963  328.4 0.34  0.39  0.06  7.28  X  X  51.06  51.96  51.59 0.62  0.62  0.68 
1964  361.9 0.31  0.35  0.74  0.08  H  X  52.85  55.45  55.99 0.36  0.36  0.41 
1965 355.3  0.31  0.37  6.34  0.01  M  M 76.92  62.48 77.61  -0.40  -0.40  -0.37 
1966  400.7  0.28  0.35  11.87 0.78 M M  53.31  89.88  70.95  -0.32  -0.32  -0.28 
1967  352.6  0.32 0.40  0.01  9.33  X  X  50.84 57.88  171.72 0.53  0.53  0.63 
1968 308  0.36  0.46 0.01  16.54  X  X  48.32  53.12  107.53  0.56  0.56  0.68 
1969  275.5 0.40  0.52  0.02  11.05  X  X  53.03  56.97  96.65 0.28  0.28  0.39 
1970 275  0.40  0.53 0.97  0.32  H  X  69.87  65.55  75.90  -0.31  -0.31  -0.25 
1971 333.3  0.33  0.45  2.03  0.01  M  X  n.a.  61.26 86.49  -0.56  -0.56  -0.52 
1972  388.9  0.29 0.41  0.01  1.16  H  X  70.84 60.62  295.92 0.00  0.00  0.10 
1973 388.9  0.29  0.45  0.00  12.14  X  X 80.28  87.49  358.02  -0.08  -0.08  0.04 
1974 464.3  0.24  0.44  0.04  3.34  X  X 113.95 141.48  384.62  -0.26  -0.26  -0.14 
1975 697.9  0.18  0.35  0.02  6.16  X  X 113.15 131.92  134.45  0.03 0.03  0.18 
1976 765.9  0.19  0.36  0.00  4.36  X  X 118.65 125.28  625.00  0.07 0.07  0.22 
1977 888.9  0.19  0.35  0.00  0.32  X  H 196.17 117.96  656.25  -0.61  -0.64  -0.59 
1978 774.7  0.23  0.47  0.00  1.08  X  H 79.17  119.86  612.50  -0.59  -0.64  -0.57 
1979 888.9  0.21  0.45  0.00  6.86  X  H 118.46 127.42 n.a. 0.24 1.02  0.49 
1980 953.7  0.21  0.47 16.66  0.00  M  H 550.00 169.78  207.53  -0.60  -0.65  -0.51 
1981 1000  0.22  0.50  4.20  0.06  M  H  152.37 156.30  168.46  -0.42  -0.65  -0.29 
1982 1077.4  0.23  0.56  3.44  0.04  M  H 149.63 136.38  241.58  -0.67  -0.81  -0.58 
1983 1540  0.18  0.44  0.00  5.33  X  H  148.86 134.12 n.a.  -0.24  0.48  -0.07 
1984 1750  0.18  0.43 22.78  3.34  M  H  174.94 136.30  186.65  -0.39  -0.60  -0.27 
1985 1870  0.18  0.45  4.98  1.42  M  H 88.02  140.07  131.72  -0.10  -0.46  0.11 
1986 1980  0.18  0.44  0.03  7.88  X  H 80.36  101.40 n.a. 0.23  2.06  0.49 
1987 2090  0.18  0.45  0.00  11.59  X  H 91.66  95.95 n.a. 0.18  1.63  0.45 
1988 2142.3  0.19  0.49  0.00  6.05  X  H 144.38 140.20  n.a. -0.24 0.81  -0.05 
1989 2230  0.20  0.36  0.00  4.20  X  H  140.09 131.63 n.a.  -0.14  0.41  -0.03 
1990 2646.7  0.19  0.36  0.00  6.98  X  H 113.76 128.01  n.a.  0.00 0.85  0.14 
1991 2870.1  0.19  0.39  0.00  0.78  H  H 184.68 141.46  n.a. -0.32  -0.32  -0.21 
1992  2396.5  0.28  0.60  14.78 1.42 M M  140.78 186.65  167.95  -0.82  -0.82  -0.77 
1993 8100  0.10  0.26  3.77  2.21  M  M  n.a.  201.51  171.17  -0.51  -0.51  -0.44 
1994  9500  0.10  0.19  17.96 2.96 M M  n.a.  133.38  164.38  -0.08  -0.08  -0.01 
1995 8000  0.14  0.23  1.54  5.17  X  M  n.a.  123.47  162.50  -0.16  1.06  -0.09 
1996 10550  0.15  0.19  0.34  9.26  X  M  n.a.  203.46  188.49  -0.11  0.33  -0.08 
1997  13732  0.12  0.16  33.24 0.12 M M  n.a.  160.69  194.82  0.09  0.09  0.13 





Table  A2  (continued)                     
                     
1999 13859  0.14  0.14  3.11  1.31  M  M 164.03 155.66  172.43  0.12 0.12  0.12 
2000  14494  0.14  0.14  15.95 0.09 M M  235.67 132.03  187.81  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
2001  13308  0.15  0.15  10.13 0.02 M M  n.a.  144.04  133.21  0.24  0.24  0.24 
2002 10340  0.20  0.20  0.68  1.25  H  M 212.81 194.94  178.62  -0.10  -0.09  -0.10 
2003 11895  0.19  0.19  3.57  0.30  M  M  n.a.  190.75  160.18  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
2004  15342  0.15  0.15  10.22 0.68 M M  215.99 265.60  242.96  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 





Appendix Table 2: Wheat trade and production data, Kenya, 1960 to 2004 
  Import Unit Values ($/kg)  Import Volumes (MT)  Production Volumes (MT) 
 FAO  Comtrade  GOK  FAO  Comtrade  GOK  FAO  GOK  FAO/GOK 
1960     0.079      1426    84200  1 
1961 0.074    0.074  13000    13004  110400  110400  1 
1962 0.077    0.077  52500    52470  134700  134700  1 
1963 0.079    0.077  12101    8523  172200  172200  1 
1964  0.040     50      128400  128400 1 
1965 0.073    0.072  5999    5999  162200  162200  1 
1966 0.073    0.073  24966    24965  216300  216300  1 
1967 0.096    0.096  4544    4512  241600  241600  1 
1968 0.091      274      221486  221486  1 
1969 0.156      45      205743  192900  1.066579 
1970            164383  153000  1.074399 
1971 0.064    0.064  13000    13000  136284  124600  1.093772 
1972 0.069    0.065  65821    68421  172332  159500  1.080451 
1973 0.133    0.133  77083    77083  158059  145500  1.086316 
1974 0.202    0.199  13103    13744  200274  186800  1.072131 
1975 0.137    0.138  81940    82917  178160  169900  1.048617 
1976 0.300    0.287  50    50  175121  165900  1.055582 
1977 0.144    0.144  33035    33035  207268  201000  1.031184 
1978 0.169    0.168  90888    90888  215674  204600  1.054125 
1979 0.309    0.309  21152    21152  214400  214400  1 
1980 0.276  0.416  0.278  48462  32462  48462  247500  234700  1.054538 
1981 0.203  0.203  0.201  49239  49239  49239  253000  242300  1.04416 
1982 0.184  0.178  0.183  139326  139326  139326  144590  135400  1.067873 
1983 0.170  0.170  0.170  81946  81946  81946  250735  193500  1.295788 
1984 0.194  0.193  0.193  149906  149906  149906  258840  224700  1.151936 
1985 0.162  0.162  0.161  143793  143793  143793  233645  148300  1.575489 
1986 0.130  0.129  0.129  115282  115282  115281  244525  220200  1.110468 
1987 0.100  0.098  0.098  217857  217857  217857  243000     
1988 0.148  0.149  0.149  75578  75578  75578  249411  78500  3.17721 
1989 0.181    0.179  123535    123535  264457  199000  1.32893 
1990 0.171  0.182  0.170  322632  97800  322632  297000  175800  1.68942 
1991 0.146  0.148  0.146  257823  257823  242612  212776  73000  2.91474 
1992 0.180  0.181  0.031  132568  132568  100808  297000  105200  2.823194 
1993 0.174  0.169    366651  366650  314410  312644  125500  2.491187 
1994 0.128  0.169  0.127  353076  311492  353076  315000  130000  2.423077 
1995 0.187  0.218  0.183  249134  206434  249134  252000  124200  2.028986 
1996 0.229  0.213  0.229  486917  486917  486917  270810  176700  1.532598 
1997  0.184  0.186  0.184  388138 388138 388138  211788  52900 4.003554 
1998  0.190  0.166  0.166  478865 478865 478865  204232  70500 2.896908 
1999  0.141  0.144  0.145  583818 583818 578543  256997  77700 3.307555 
2000 0.199  0.144  0.144  632145  632145  636045  307215     
2001 0.157  0.156  0.155  637953  641253  617542  378665     
2002 0.117  0.141  0.137  539486  448976  515179  379425     
2003 0.164  0.164    480268  480268    380000     
2004 0.211  0.225    404068  373128        
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Appendix Table 3: Coffee producer NRA, assuming excess cooperative pulping charges, 

























Smallholders  -0.19 -0.09  -0.21  -0.27 -0.12 -0.23 -0.22 -0.29  -0.15  -0.13 





Appendix Table 4: Prices for refined sugar, Kenya, 1963 to 2004 
        
  Import Unit Value  Import Unit Value  Free Market Price  Excise Tax Collected 
  GOK (US$/KG)  FAOSTAT (US$/KG)  World Bank (US$/KG)  Ksh/KG consumed 
1963 0.141  0.139  0.187  0.268 
1964 0.162  0.159  0.129  0.167 
1965 0.081  0.081  0.047  0.128 
1966 0.078  0.078  0.041  0.312 
1967 0.894  0.081  0.045  0.383 
1968 0.072  0.072  0.044  0.397 
1969 0.106  0.106  0.074  0.409 
1970 0.123  0.123  0.083  0.288 
1971 0.147  0.147  0.100  0.226 
1972 0.190  0.190  0.164  0.264 
1973 0.248  0.248  0.212  0.317 
1974 0.352  0.351  0.661  0.372 
1975 0.557  0.552  0.452  0.724 
1976 0.392  0.391  0.255  0.886 
1977 0.265  0.266  0.179  1.016 
1978 0.255  0.257  0.172  na 
1979 0.297  0.297  0.213  na 
1980 0.676  0.672  0.632  na 
1981 0.690  0.699  0.372  na 
1982 0.412  0.414  0.186  1.395 
1983 0.338  0.338  0.187  0.847 
1984 0.344  0.347  0.115  0.771 
1985 0.178  0.178  0.090  0.576 
1986 0.250  0.252  0.133  0.828 
1987 0.248  0.253  0.149  0.873 
1988 0.323  0.321  0.225  0.954 
1989 0.454  0.393  0.282  0.892 
1990 0.529  0.533  0.277  na 
1991 7.669  0.450  0.198  0.616 
1992 5.251  0.402  0.200  0.649 
1993 0.244  0.271  0.220  na 
1994 0.406  0.407  0.267  0.032 
1995 0.393  0.396  0.293  0.001 
1996 0.322  0.443  0.264  na 
1997 0.415  0.415  0.251  0.006 
1998 0.330  0.378  0.197  0.000 
1999 0.294  0.285  0.138  0.002 
2000 0.287  0.437  0.180  0.074 
2001 0.326  0.460  0.190  0.000 
2002 0.312  0.316  0.152  0.000 
2003   0.310  0.156  0.000 
2004   0.310  0.158  0.000 




Appendix Table 5: Gross marketed production of farm products, Kenya, 1962 to 2004 
(current prices, million Kenya shillings) 




Calves Dairy Other  Total 
1962 66.5 42.7 189.6  133.9 23.5 22.0 114.0 96.5  264.1  952.9
1963 57.5 65.6 203.2  134.7 23.9 23.4 107.2 99.1  326.1 1040.7
1964 38.0 73.0 299.8  154.3 23.5 19.6 188.6 88.0  321.5 1206.4
1965 37.0 86.3 262.1  146.6 30.9 25.9 187.4 94.6  273.7 1144.5
1966 53.9 69.6 372.4  198.1 19.8 36.1 218.4 113.2  295.0 1376.6
1967 104.4  91.5 279.9  178.5 32.0 36.7 226.5 127.6 269.1  1346.2
1968 108.1 132.7 245.3  186.7 43.6 40.9 233.4 142.5 292.9  1426.1
1969 77.2  131.7 323.3  223.2 58.8 38.3 244.4 122.0  269.6 1488.4
1970 56.6 99.9 362.9  276.8 65.7 75.4 262.0 136.1  291.1 1626.3
1971 85.5  104.1 378.4  236.1 69.1 95.9 266.6 186.0  312.1 1733.9
1972 145.0  83.2 483.3  320.7 60.8 111.0 330.2 217.8 366.7  2118.6
1973 171.4  77.3 655.4  335.3 89.1 97.3 327.1 226.1 487.1  2466.1
1974 169.6 140.2 689.5  390.5 118.3 115.8 352.2 202.0 755.1  2933.3
1975 340.4 165.5 706.9  458.3 164.6 172.5 396.5 215.6 619.0  3239.3
1976 432.6 240.9 2026.7  655.1 192.4 206.5 381.1 241.0 624.6  5000.9
1977 376.9 237.5 3998.4  1854.6 267.3 198.1 468.7 376.7 513.5  8291.7
1978 210.0 233.5 2376.4  1478.3 347.8 200.8 698.8 391.7 730.3  6667.8
1979 187.3 297.7 2113.7  1346.9 466.0 231.3 581.8 349.3 701.1  6275.1
1980 207.8 353.4 2377.1  1430.3 590.4 227.5 678.2 300.1 901.3  7066.2
1981 472.9 357.4 2049.4  1611.8 617.5 270.7 958.9 456.0 939.1  7733.8
1982 615.5 441.4 2457.3  1863.8 588.2 286.9 1045.2 570.2  1110.0  8978.5
1983 979.0 538.4 3325.0  2606.2 686.8 319.2 1036.2 656.0 961.8 11108.6
1984 981.0 356.8 4553.4  6022.4 819.8 311.4 1179.0 515.6  1036.4 15775.8
1985 1091.2  525.2 3837.8  4952.0 935.0 445.4 1407.2 724.8 1200.2  15118.8
1986 1330.0  657.6 5766.4  4846.6 1055.8 1076.2 1685.2 1130.2 1218.4  18766.4
1987 1361.8  437.6 3843.2  3895.2 1109.4 1016.6 2077.4 1241.6 1384.4  16367.2
1988 1083.6  702.4 5562.2  4074.4 1400.4 438.0 2777.6 1213.4 1603.0  18855.0
1989 1397.8  799.2 4878.0  4906.4 1568.2 701.0 2979.6 1324.2 1509.6  20064.0
1990 1381.0  372.6 4067.2  6936.4 2078.2 570.2 5382.0 1686.6 2052.0  24526.2
1991 927.4 998.6 4053.2  7801.0 2147.2 484.4 3876.0 1578.0  2691.8 24557.6
1992 1538.6  705.0 4365.0  8933.4 2303.6 459.0 4142.4 3825.0  171.8  26443.8
1993 1959.2  412.6 7695.8  19867.0 3171.4 460.4 4704.0 1943.0 3009.4  43222.8
1994 3001.6 1261.8 11758.2  18300.2 5177.6 660.2 5054.2 3229.0 3909.6  52352.4
1995 3207.6 1632.0 15289.2  16595.8 6824.2 690.2 6051.6 5075.0 5365.2  60730.8
1996 3118.8 2113.2 14357.8  20336.4 7125.2 780.0 7261.8 3863.8 5960.6  64917.6
1997 2809.2 2198.4 16545.6  23635.0 6644.2 1111.8 8714.6 2862.4 6612.6  71133.8
1998 2776.6 2986.0 13197.8  39137.2 7967.2 1480.2 8878.8 1946.6 6397.8  84768.2
1999 3098.0 1006.0 10050.4  31087.6 7639.4 1149.3 8886.4 2693.6 8121.7  73732.4
2000 2915.4 1132.9 11282.0  35969.8 7942.2 6563.0 8039.8 2051.2 9195.6  85091.9
2001 6141.6 1429.4 6424.2  38564.5 7154.8 9595.0 9078.6 1919.6 8556.4  88864.1
2002 4451.4  987.5 5441.1  33414.7 9070.2 11931.0 11823.8 2468.9 8593.2  88181.8
2003 3336.5 1375.3 5956.7  34631.1 7567.3 12344.0 11476.1 2846.1 8339.6  87872.7
2004 6880.5 1864.0 7284.5  41212.2 8389.8 13871.0 11284.8 4385.0  27110.1 122281.9
From Government of Kenya, Statistical Abstract of Kenya 
Horticulture is treated inconsistently and incompletely through the period.    
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Appendix Table 6: Prices for primary products, Kenya, 1960 to 2004 
 Maize    (DP-BP)/    Wheat    (DP-BP)/   Coffee    (DP-BP)/
 DP  BP  BP    DP  BP  BP    DP  BP  BP 
1960 480.36  288.41  0.67   532.39  464.62  0.15    6710.44  7133.99  -0.06 
1961 514.24  587.21  -0.12   645.34  641.09  0.01    6809.51  6712.01  0.01 
1962 446.90  245.14  0.82   649.19  666.59  -0.03    5830.62  6641.33  -0.12 
1963 456.89  271.34  0.68   660.98  684.54  -0.03    7114.87  5849.47  0.22 
1964 490.26  858.69  0.41   651.06  499.94  0.30    6787.17  7123.98  -0.05 
1965 488.25  776.26  -0.37   652.85  502.31  0.30    6665.51  7334.61  -0.09 
1966 540.32  748.14  -0.28   680.42  718.27  -0.05    5951.90  7567.16  -0.21 
1967 494.67  304.04  0.63   704.87  600.72  0.17    6528.34  6817.81  -0.04 
1968 450.60  268.62  0.68   705.19  551.01  0.28    6526.82  7269.01  -0.10 
1969 417.85  301.05  0.39   687.45  651.47  0.06    6429.36  7508.89  -0.14 
1970 420.47  807.85  -0.25   596.46  610.27  -0.02    7601.95  9909.32  -0.23 
1971 484.27  1000.80  -0.52   657.06  653.39  0.01    6499.19  7864.99  -0.17 
1972 548.67  500.73  0.10   665.87  767.01  -0.13    7926.48  9774.01  -0.19 
1973 563.50  542.17  0.04   741.80 1400.84  -0.47    9347.02  11670.48  -0.20 
1974 669.99  778.46  -0.14   1009.29 1783.67  -0.43   10221.22 11793.58  -0.13 
1975 942.92  796.67  0.18   1292.12 1128.51  0.14   10831.68 10612.84  0.02 
1976 1038.97  850.36  0.22   1476.07 1369.24  0.08    25386.19  25349.55  0.00 
1977 1202.45  2931.48  -0.59   1646.84 1389.61  0.19    39901.57  43293.74  -0.08 
1978 1141.34  2635.84  -0.57   1699.93 1590.20  0.07    28335.60  30321.44  -0.07 
1979 1284.79  863.68  0.49   1832.29 2873.05  -0.36    28506.69  29831.27  -0.04 
1980 1404.45  2883.00  -0.51   2089.35 2659.76  -0.21    26508.84  30046.63  -0.12 
1981 1503.06  2127.94  -0.29   2169.72 2410.86  -0.10    22748.06  28503.90  -0.20 
1982 1684.42  4004.11  -0.58   2482.81 2744.93  -0.10    27967.34  33214.64  -0.16 
1983 2216.21  2380.56  -0.07   2898.20 2871.50  0.01    35050.69  38233.61  -0.08 
1984 2495.75  3401.70  -0.27   3435.74 3508.65  -0.02    38614.10  45854.05  -0.16 
1985 2712.75  2449.17  0.11   3552.74 3137.27  0.13    39897.58  44474.88  -0.10 
1986 2844.10  1902.61  0.49   3794.10 2503.23  0.52    50381.14  62980.04  -0.20 
1987 3028.74  2092.33  0.45   3888.73 2133.79  0.82    36804.76  43467.84  -0.15 
1988 3196.18  3349.73  -0.05   4510.87 3222.49  0.40    44838.45  58170.46  -0.23 
1989 3029.47  3113.90  -0.03   4227.46 4392.83  -0.04    43312.22  43819.55  -0.01 
1990 3588.33  3152.97  0.14   5441.62 4453.90  0.22    36556.07  38185.16  -0.04 
1991 4000.85  5034.50  -0.21   6130.74 4781.72  0.28    46739.99  52452.37  -0.11 
1992 3836.31  16809.27  -0.77   5296.49 8667.70  -0.39    41663.99  60605.34  -0.31 
1993 10201.81  18149.73  -0.44    7751.80 15993.53 -0.52    99068.07  165763.16  -0.40 
1994 11304.96  11374.66  -0.01   13804.94 10325.02 0.34    144490.23 178114.21  -0.19 
1995 9833.01  10841.40  -0.09   14833.00 10471.80 0.42   159876.47 169145.01  -0.05 
1996 12545.49  13624.54  -0.08   17625.48 14910.01 0.18    139356.80 141455.23  -0.01 
1997 15954.22  14135.94  0.13   19922.20 12401.71 0.61    251725.22 249582.61  0.01 
1998 14679.17  18463.54  -0.20   18735.95 13776.72 0.36    257409.72 302076.69  -0.15 
1999 15771.33  14067.38  0.12   20062.31 14149.55 0.42    156556.32 161599.29  -0.03 
2000 16522.60  16635.09  -0.01   18545.58 12508.62 0.48    115326.01 126013.86  -0.08 
2001 15368.07  12382.25  0.24   20468.06 13849.55 0.48    118004.79 111996.66  0.05 
2002 12417.65  13535.27  -0.09   19320.63 12600.65 0.53    119877.66 154698.39  -0.23 
2003 14117.22  14957.63  -0.06   21310.20 14124.54 0.51   97545.63  99538.33 -0.02  
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Appendix Table 6 (cont’d): Prices for primary products, Kenya, 1960 to 2004 
  Tea    (DP-BP)/    Sugar (cif price)  (DP-BP)/    Fruit & Veg (tradable) (DP-BP)/
 DP  BP  BP    DP BP  NRA    NRA  BP  BP 
1960 7951.5  7483.231  0.06                
1961 7841.4  6805.808  0.15                
1962 8458.1  7102.147  0.19                
1963 7760  7204.253  0.08           2680.37  2736.13  -0.02 
1964 7210  6689.789  0.08    49.59  69.99  -0.29147    2412.56  2428.43  -0.01 
1965  7410 7193.689 0.03    59.65  30.92 0.929087   2789.89  2886.90  -0.03 
1966  7800 8230.697 -0.05    42.10  31.79 0.324182   3415.61  3998.67  -0.15 
1967  7830 8557.583 -0.09    42.20  33.60 0.256086   2784.46  3272.45  -0.15 
1968  5850 7241.887 -0.19    46.00  27.38 0.679813   3266.46  3679.16  -0.11 
1969 6189.1  7427.947  -0.17  45.20  47.72  -0.05272    2735.28  3345.33  -0.18 
1970 6737.8  8369.445  -0.19  45.20  59.58  -0.24132    3425.54  4442.81  -0.23 
1971 6504.7  7669.13  -0.15  45.20  70.10  -0.35519    2790.52  3412.89  -0.18 
1972 6014  8301.17  -0.28    50.00  104.21  -0.52018    3915.80  5346.25  -0.27 
1973 5926.8  7641.044  -0.22  51.80  135.97  -0.61903    3159.35  4219.51  -0.25 
1974 7206.2  8418.411  -0.14  61.80  182.65  -0.66165    3385.51  3948.03  -0.14 
1975 8078.4  8588.733  -0.06  89.80  287.79  -0.68796    7493.87  8002.28  -0.06 
1976 10569.3  10978.03  -0.04  104.50  224.89  -0.53532    4704.37  5136.68  -0.08 
1977 21492  20200.57  0.06   127.10  132.79  -0.04284    4734.01  4830.94  -0.02 
1978  15832 15334.92  0.03    133.00  121.89 0.091147    4487.72 4832.66  -0.07 
1979 13566.9  14180.07  -0.04  133.00  140.88  -0.05595    4696.11  5200.91  -0.10 
1980 15911  17714.4  -0.10   133.00  384.16  -0.65379    5637.47  6641.05  -0.15 
1981 17723.4  18635.88  -0.05  145.10  483.49  -0.69989    7038.47  8266.86  -0.15 
1982 19407.8  23371.75  -0.17  170.00  333.91  -0.49088    8747.55  10852.75 -0.19 
1983 21840  27523.38  -0.21   227.00  297.76  -0.23764    10358.32  11821.88 -0.12 
1984 51840  46910.4  0.11   227.00  330.28  -0.31271    9735.13  11113.81 -0.12 
1985  33660 31115.31  0.08    270.00  149.00 0.812115   10502.71  10974.63 -0.04 
1986 33820  30651.4  0.10   297.00  231.03  0.285547    13163.83  13870.81 -0.05 
1987  25000 27620.23  -0.09    300.00  253.99 0.181133   14183.10  16614.62 -0.15 
1988 20371.9  28471.09  -0.28  358.30  349.65  0.024747    17248.87  19058.17 -0.09 
1989 27170  33277.62  -0.18   368.00  488.20  -0.24621    13762.32  14227.48 -0.03 
1990 35210  37211.08  -0.05   449.00  764.09  -0.41237    18867.83  19156.19 -0.02 
1991 38480  45307.02  -0.15   521.00  778.74  -0.33097    15680.56  16902.33 -0.07 
1992 29246.4  70763.64  -0.59  399.10  922.80  -0.56751    21687.20  28457.86 -0.24 
1993 92417.5  140921 -0.34  826.00  1087.98  -0.2408    39517.50  57692.44 -0.32 
1994 87475  93130.79  -0.06   1553.00  1297.28  0.197122    43869.08  43869.08 0.00 
1995 67868  78797.59  -0.14   1553.00  1144.93  0.356414    41215.74  41215.74 0.00 
1996 79080  87634.96  -0.10   1553.00  1488.61  0.043256    45378.65  46923.71 -0.03 
1997  106800 122215.2  -0.13    1553.00  1414.12 0.098206    41447.37  43359.53 -0.04 
1998  133000 132130.7  0.01    1730.00  1329.88 0.300873    55294.14  60285.98 -0.08 
1999 125000  128892.8  -0.03   1730.00  998.42  0.732738    50488.72  50488.72 0.00 
2000  152290 156777.1  -0.03    2015.00  1857.76 0.084642    73413.32  73413.33 0.00 
2001 130890  122692.9  0.07    2015  2027.261  -0.00605    84106.59  84106.60 0.00 
2002 116387  120640 -0.04   2015  1245.38  0.61798    53129.39  53129.39 0.00 
2003 117925  119476 -0.01   1800  1163.88  0.546552    113308.23 113308.23 0.00  
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2004 126960  124358.6  0.02    1900  1202.543  0.579985    91137.02  91137.02 0.00 
Source: Author’s calculations 
Note: DP= Domestic price in Kenya Shillings per MT. BP= Border Price in Kenya shillings per MT.  
 (DP-BP)/BP data include post farm activities bringing commodity to wholesale market.  
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Appendix Table 7: Exchange rate, Shillings per US dollar, Kenya, 1960 to 2004 
 Official  Parallel  Retention Estimated
  Rate Rate Rate  Equilibrium
1960 7.14 7.20 0.25 7.18 
1961 7.14 7.29 0.25 7.23 
1962 7.14 7.22 0.25 7.19 
1963 7.14 7.33 0.25 7.26 
1964 7.14 7.20 0.25 7.18 
1965 7.14 7.45 0.25 7.33 
1966 7.14 8.64 0.25 8.08 
1967 7.14 8.68 0.25 8.11 
1968 7.14 8.25 0.25 7.84 
1969 7.14 9.10 0.25 8.37 
1970 7.14 9.75 0.25 8.77 
1971 7.14 9.10 0.25 8.37 
1972 7.14 10.35 0.25  9.15 
1973 7.02 9.92 0.25 8.83 
1974 7.13 8.59 0.25 8.05 
1975 7.34 7.96 0.25 7.73 
1976 8.37 9.31 0.25 8.96 
1977 8.28 8.49 0.25 8.41 
1978 7.73 8.46 0.25 8.19 
1979 7.48 8.46 0.25 8.09 
1980 7.42 9.05 0.25 8.44 
1981 9.05 10.99 0.25 10.26 
1982 10.92 14.16 0.25  12.94 
1983 13.31 15.63 0.25  14.76 
1984 14.41 16.93 0.25  15.98 
1985 16.43 17.34 0.25  17.00 
1986 16.23 17.30 0.25  16.90 
1987 16.45 19.93 0.25  18.62 
1988 17.75 20.04 0.25  19.18 
1989 20.57 21.43 0.25  21.11 
1990 22.91 23.35 0.25  23.18 
1991 27.51 30.15 0.25  29.16 
1992 32.22 44.60 0.25  39.95 
1993 58.00 90.83 0.25  78.52 
1994 56.05 56.05 0.25  56.05 
1995 51.43 51.43 0.25  51.43 
1996 57.11 59.51 0.25  58.61 
1997 58.73 62.07 0.25  60.82 
1998 60.37 67.07 0.25  64.56 
1999 70.33 70.33 0.25  70.33 
2000 76.18 76.18 0.25  76.18 
2001 78.56 78.56 0.25  78.56 
2002 78.75 78.75 0.25  78.75 
2003 75.94 75.94 0.25  75.94  
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2004 79.17 79.17 0.25  79.17 
2005 75.55 75.55 0.25  75.55 
Sources: Easterly, World Development Indicators Online, authors calculations 
See Anderson et al. (2008) for methodology used to estimate the equilibrium rate.  
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Appendix Table 8: Production and trade of covered farm products, Kenya. 1961 to 2004 
   
       
 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000  1999-2004
Maize       
Production Share  (a)  0.29  0.27  0.25  0.29  0.26 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.38 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.39 
% Production Exported  (b)  5.10  3.54  4.69  2.37  0.61 
% Consumption Imported (b)  3.24  1.88  3.54  10.37  7.28 
Best  Practice  Margin  0.34 0.23 0.19 0.15 0.16 
Estimated  Margin  0.41 0.42 0.45 0.24 0.16 
       
Wheat       
Production Share  (a)  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.11 
% Production Exported  (b)  23.44  7.42  0.53  5.62  0.16 
% Consumption Imported (b)  10.00  20.45  36.04  59.09  65.28 
Best  Practice  Margin  0.21 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 
Estimated  Margin  0.26 0.27 0.29 0.19 0.11 
       
Coffee       
Production Share  (a)  0.17  0.22  0.19  0.11  0.06 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% Production Exported  (b)  96.36  100.27  96.35  99.76  93.10 
% Consumption Imported (b)  41.89  2.32  0.33  5.52  5.64 
Best  Practice  Margin  -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.05 
Estimated  Margin  0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 
       
Tea       
Production Share  (a)  0.09  0.12  0.18  0.21  0.23 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 
% Production Exported  (b)  108.98  99.98  91.97  93.51  93.07 
% Consumption Imported (b) (c)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Best  Practice  Margin  0.11 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Estimated  Margin  0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.04 




Appendix Table 8 (cont’d): Production and trade of covered farm products, Kenya, 1961 
to 2004 
 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000  1999-2004
S u g a r        
Production  Share    (a)  0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.06 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 
% Production Exported  (b)  1.06  2.98  3.17  12.82  4.47 
%  Consumption  Imported  (b)  49.37 26.56 10.97 26.94 29.66 
Estimated  Margin  0.50 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.47 
       
Export Fruits and Vegetables           
Production  Share    (a)  0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
%  Production  Exported    (b)  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
%  Consumption  Imported  (b)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Estimated  Margin  3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
       
Non-Tradable Fruits and Vegetables         
Production  Share    (a)  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 
%  Production  Exported    (b)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
%  Consumption  Imported  (b)  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Estimated  Margin  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
       
Other  Exportable  Agriculture       
Production  Share  (a)  0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.02 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NRA  -0.09 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 0.00 
       
Other  Importable  Agriculture       
Production  Share  (a)  0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.00 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.04 
NRA  0.31 0.31 0.31 0.26 0.31 
       
Other  Non-Tradable  Agriculture       
Production  Share  (a)  0.25 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.15 
Consumption  Share  (a)  0.34 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.21 
NRA  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(a) Based on value at undistorted prices. 
(b) Based on volume. 
(c) Consumption data for tea appeared unreliable. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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 Appendix Table 9: Annual distortion estimates, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
   Coffee  Maize  Sugar  Tea 
Vegetables 
and fruits  Wheat 
All 
covered  
1956  -13 54 na na na  3 18 
1957  -17 64 na  2 na  5 24 
1958 -4 72 na  2 na 22 33 
1959  -10 48 na  6 na 19 20 
1960 -6 63 na  6 na 13 26 
1961 1  -16  na  16  -1  -2  -7 
1962  -12 76 na 19 -1 -5 18 
1963 20 62 na  8 -2 -7 29 
1964 -6 36  -29  8 -1 27 13 
1965 -10 -40  93  4  -3  26 -22 
1966 -22 -32  32  -2 -12 -10 -21 
1967 -5 53 26 -5  -12 12 16 
1968  -11 56 68  -17 -9 22 15 
1969 -15  28  -5 -13 -15  1  1 
1970 -24 -31 -24 -15 -19  -8 -23 
1971 -18 -56 -36 -11 -15  -6 -36 
1972 -20  0 -52 -22 -22 -20 -15 
1973 -21  -8 -62 -18 -21 -52 -21 
1974 -14 -26 -66 -11 -11 -49 -26 
1975 1 3  -69  -5  -5 4  -9 
1976 -1  7  -54 -3 -7 -2 -2 
1977 -9  -61 -4  6 -2  8  -30 
1978 -7  -59  9  3 -6 -5  -29 
1979 -5 24 -6 -6 -8  -44 -3 
1980 -13 -60 -65 -12 -12 -31 -38 
1981 -21 -42 -70  -7 -12 -22 -33 
1982 -17 -67 -49 -19 -16 -23 -45 
1983  -9 -24 -24 -24 -10 -13 -19 
1984 -17 -39 -31  10 -10 -15 -14 
1985 -11 -10  81  3  -3  -3  -3 
1986  -21 23 29  6 -4 32  1 
1987  -16 18 18  -14  -12 56 -1 
1988 -24 -24  2 -35  -7  20 -22 
1989  -2 -14 -25 -25  -3 -12 -15 
1990 -5  0  -41  -13 -1 12  -10 
1991 -12 -32 -33 -22  -6  16 -22 
1992 -32 -82 -57 -63 -19 -48 -67 
1993 -41 -51 -24 -34 -26 -59 -41 
1994 -20  -8  20 -15  0  26  -9 
1995  -6 -16  36 -25  0  34 -11 
1996  -1 -11  4 -20  -3  15  -9 
1997 1 9  10  -20  -3  57  -1 
1998 -15 -20  30  -6  -6  36  -9 
1999 -3 12 73 -3  0 42  8 
2000 -8 -1  8 -3  0 48 -1 
2001  5 24 -1  7  0 48 12 
2002 -23 -10  62  -4  0  53  -1 
2003 -2 -6 55 -1  0 51  3 
2004 11 -5 58  2  0 31  5  
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 Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b 
and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries 
   (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1956 0 18 0 23 21 3 36 18  15
1957 0 24 0 26 27 5 41 18  19
1958 0 33 0 32 35 22 51 21  25
1959 0 20 0 25 20 19 38 23  12
1960 0 26 0 29 26 30 45 21  20
1961 0 -7 0 4 5 -16 6 16  -9
1962 0 18 0 22 21 -5 35 26  7
1963 0 29 0 34 31 31 57 24  27
1964 0 13 0 26 2 -29 45 22  18
1965 0 -22 0 -4 -1 -37 -5 28  -26
1966 0 -21 0 -6 -15 -30 -9 31  -30
1967 0 16 0 22 17 26 36 29  5
1968 0 15 0 23 15 68 37 28  8
1969 0 1 0 13 1 -5 19 30  -8
1970 0 -23 0 -10 -19 -24 -4 32  -27
1971 0 -36 0 -23 -14 -54 -29 28  -44
1972 0 -15 0 -3 -13 -36 -5 21  -21
1973 0 -21 0 -10 -15 -57 -12 22  -28
1974 0 -26 0 -13 -19 -58 -17 19  -30
1975 0 -9 0 4 1 -51 6 19  -11
1976 0 -2 0 10 2 -54 13 20  -6
1977 0 -30 0 -21 -5 2 8 20  -10
1978 0 -29 0 -15 -4 3 18 21  -2
1979 0 -3 0 13 -6 -26 14 20  -5
1980 0 -38 0 -23 -12 -57 -8 31  -30
1981 0 -33 0 -19 -16 -60 -14 32  -35
1982 0 -45 0 -30 -18 -39 1 39  -27
1983 0 -19 0 -16 -16 -19 -17 32  -37
1984 0 -14 0 -5 -3 -27 5 32  -21
1985 0 -3 0 11 -3 33 25 28  -2
1986 0 1 0 13 -10 30 14 30  -13
1987 0 -1 0 21 -15 30 31 30  1
1988 0 -22 0 -9 -27 8 -5 29  -26
1989 0 -15 0 17 -14 -21 36 25  9
1990 0 -10 0 2 -10 -29 4 21  -15
1991 0 -22 0 -8 -18 -20 2 15  -12
1992 0 -67 -2 7 -53 -78 8 17  -8
1993 0 -41 -3 -31 -36 -49 -35 21  -46
1994 0 -9 0 1 -15 -2 1 15  -13
1995 0 -11 0 -2 -16 -4 -2 16  -16
1996 0 -9 0 -1 -12 -6 -1 13  -13
1997 0 -1 0 4 -12 13 5 13  -7
1998 0 -9 -1 -3 -8 -10 -3 14  -16
1999 0 8 0 13 -3 22 17 12  4
2000 0 -1 0 5 -4 4 7 13  -5
2001 0 12 0 16 6 22 21 11  9
2002 0 -1 0 7 -6 7 9 11  -2
2003 0 3  09 - 1 7 1 29   3
2004 0 5 0 10 3 7 13 9  4
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
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Appendix Table 9 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Kenya, 1956 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products  
(percent) 
   Coffee Maize Sugar Tea Veg. and fruit Wheat Non-covered 
1956 28 28 na na na 10 35
1957 18 27 na 9n a 93 6
1958 18 28 na 11 na 6 38
1959 20 27 na 12 na 7 35
1960 18 26 na 14 na 6 36
1961 16 38 na 735 3 0
1962 29 18 na 1 044 3 5
1963 20 22 na 1 155 3 7
1964 21 24 3 10 4 4 34
1965 16 42 1 8 4 4 26
1966 22 33 1 10 4 4 26
1967 21 22 2 12 4 5 34
1968 18 21 2 13 5 6 34
1969 21 20 3 14 4 7 31
1970 25 25 4 14 4 5 24
1971 18 41 4 10 3 4 19
1972 24 25 4 16 5 4 23
1973 26 25 7 13 3 5 20
1974 22 30 8 12 3 7 17
1975 17 32 11 11 5 4 20
1976 30 28 6 10 3 4 20
1977 30 39 2 12 2 1 15
1978 25 39 3 14 2 2 15
1979 29 16 6 19 3 7 20
1980 23 32 12 13 2 4 14
1981 24 25 15 14 3 4 14
1982 17 46 6 13 3 3 12
1983 20 28 6 21 4 4 17
1984 26 20 6 26 3 2 18
1985 21 26 3 24 3 4 20
1986 31 20 3 20 3 2 21
1987 23 22 5 23 5 2 20
1988 26 27 5 18 4 2 17
1989 19 25 8 24 4 3 18
1990 14 21 11 27 5 3 19
1991 12 28 9 27 4 3 17
1992 8 50 5 23437
1993 13 35 4 30 5 3 10
1994 15 32 4 22 5 3 19
1995 17 27 5 23 5 3 19
1996 14 26 6 26 6 4 19
1997 15 25 5 26 5 3 21
1998 11 28 4 29 5 2 20
1999 10 26 4 29 6 2 22
2000 10 25 6 29 8 2 21
2001 5 25 6 30 9 3 23
2002 7 25 5 31 7 3 21
2003 4 27 4 28 11 4 21
2004 5 27 4 28 9 5 22
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices 